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AbstrAct
The great benefits of modern healthcare must be weighed against the risk of patient injury 
due to human intervention. Studies show that adverse events (AE) are identified in up to 
16.6% of all hospitalisations. As a step toward preventing AEs, efforts are made to collect 
patient safety information at different levels in the healthcare systems. The information 
is neither effectively organised nor integrated within the healthcare systems, leading to 
difficulty achieving systematic analysis. This may be due to the use of different methods 
that yield qualitatively different information about AE. 
The general aim of this thesis was to evaluate the capability of retrospective record review 
(RRR) methods to identify patient safety and quality information in orthopaedic care. 
In papers I and II, 395 patient records were retrospectively examined for AEs using both 
traditional incident reporting methods and RRR for the same cohort. More AEs were 
identified using RRR than by using traditional incident reporting methods. Also, paper II 
showed that more AEs were due to deficiencies in care processes rather than to deficiencies 
in technical skills.
In paper III, the efficiency of an orthopaedic nursing improvement initiative, called 
“improvement theme months,” was evaluated using case study methodology and a RRR of 
2,281 patients. Results showed significant improvement over time in performance of risk 
assessment for pressure ulcers and lowered pressure ulcer prevalence. We found RRR easy 
to use and valuable as a method to assess improvement over time. 
In paper IV, the RRR methods, Harvard Medical Practice Study (HMPS) and Global Trigger 
Tool (GTT) were compared for capability to identify AEs in a sample of 350 randomly 
selected orthopaedic admissions. Results showed that HMPS identified more AEs than GTT 
did. The overall positive predictive value (PPV) was 40% and 30% for HMPS and GTT 
methods, respectively.
Retrospective record review appears to achieve wider coverage when identifying orthopaedic 
AEs at a local level. Given that many current methods vary considerably in quality of data 
gathered and in coverage, which require multiple methods to be used concurrently, the wider 
coverage characteristic of RRR is an advantage. Consequently, RRR could play a vital 
role in quality and safety information systems in order to identify, categorise, and analyse 
quality and patient safety problems and to provide the basis for interventions. Increased 
awareness, consideration of risk factors, interventions focused on multidisciplinary and 
interdepartmental teamwork, and strategies that focus on healthcare processes may reduce 
the frequency of AEs in orthopaedic care. Also, RRR can incorporate a time series display 
of patient safetyintervention outcomes to drive change.
As a method, improvement theme months may serve to organise quality and lead to safety 
improvement in nursing. However, we found that it was associated with a lengthy period 
of time before new guidelines, quality indicators, and safety initiatives were noticed and 
became widely used in clinical practice. To achieve sustainable and significant improvement, 
interventions on many levels of the organisation were needed. 
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“The problem of harm arising from healthcare management is not new nor is the interest 
in this. What has changed in the past 10-20 years is the general acceptance of the need 
for measurement and assessment of scale and causes of harm followed by interventions to 
improve the safety of healthcare” p. 281.
A pioneer to measure patient harm in surgery was Ernest Codman, a Boston surgeon in the early 
20th century. He took a major step by starting to systematically detect and understand medical 
errors. He was dissatisfied with the observed quality of care and apparent unwillingness in 
healthcare to evaluate surgical outcomes. He proposed that hospitals should follow patients 
long enough after hospitalisation to determine whether treatment was effective or not. If 
an unsuccessful treatment was found, the hospital should attempt to determine why, in 
order to learn from these failures and prevent recurrence. During the years, 1911-1916, 
he noted 123 errors from 337 patients and analysed the causes in his own hospital, which 
he creatively named, “End Result Hospital”. He openly published these results in annuals 
reports and distributed this information to major hospitals in order to challenge colleagues 
to, in turn, demonstrate their outcomes. Codman is credited for holding the first morbidity 
and mortality conferences for internal audit in hospitals. He assisted in the founding of the 
American College of Surgeons, and later, in collaboration with other organisations, created 
Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals, the largest accrediting body in the US2 3.
While healthcare-associated harm, or iatrogenic injury, had been noticed earlier, this area had 
seldom been systematically investigated using either retrospective or prospective approach. 
In the sixties, investigative studies were carried out4 5. In the early 1970’s, the Californian 
Medical Insurance Feasibility Study (CMIFS) initiated the first major investigative use of 
RRR, a structured review approach6. Steel at al.7 followed with a study using prospective 
structured record review that also included interviews with personnel and other information 
sources available at the hospital. Couch et al.8 used a prospective study design to examine 
errors in surgery care. 
The Harvard Medical Practice Study (HMPS) using retrospective record review found that 
AEs occur in 3.7% of the hospitalisations9. With the release of the Institute of Medicine’s 
report, To Err is Human10, such findings led to massive debate. The report articulated 
recommended actions to improve patient safety at all levels of the healthcare system. 
According to Wachter11, the modern patient safety movement began with this report. Since 
then, many reports and official statements from that issue have been released. 
To Err is Human10 led many countries to conduct AE studies, and measure their AE rates. 
The reported outcomes highlight the need to improve patient safety. In the late 2007, the 
Swedish National Board of Health and Welfare performed a study based on the HMPS 
protocol12 13. A representative sample, consisting of 1967 admissions, was reviewed. In total, 
12.3% of the 1967 admissions contained AEs, of which 70% were judged to be preventable. 
10
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The most common types of AEs were healthcare-associated infection and organ injury. 
Of the preventable AEs, 62% were related to surgical specialities. Fifteen percent of AEs 
identified in these study reports contributed to permanent disability or deaths.
The healthcare burden of AEs is considerable14-18. The healthcare burden of AEs includes 
both individually affected patients, as well as the whole healthcare system19. Reported 
in To Err is Human is that between 44,000 and 98,000 people die in US hospitals every 
year where the AE was a contributing cause of the death10. Extrapolating to the 1.2 million 
annual admissions during the sampled year, Swedish study results correspond to 105,000 
preventable AEs and are calculated to have resulted in approximately 630,000 extra days of 
hospitalisation, contributing to 3,000 deaths and 50,000 unnecessary outpatient visits13. 
11
terms And definitions
In this section I will present and discuss different terms and definitions in the patient safety 
field. 
Standardised definitions are adopted within the patient safety field, but standard usage is 
inconsistent20-22. The conceptual meaning of some terms is, at times, unclear, which confuses 
rather than clarifies11. Terminology has also been taken from different perspectives and is 
aimed toward various purposes. In some studies, consistent terms and definitions have been 
used but careful description of how the terms had been applied, for example, by reviewers, 
was lacking. Across studies, on the other hand, meanings behind terms were different. 
Consequently, one’s ability to evaluate outcome within the same used methodology and 
between studies with different methodologies may be limited23.
In 2009, the World Health Organization (WHO) presented a report on international 
classification for patient safety. The aim was to develop an international taxonomy in this 
field in order to promote standardisation of terminology, definitions and classifications. It 
also includes a glossary of patient safety terms taken from various references20. Patient safety 
is set as a subset of quality11. See a list of commonly used patient safety terms preferred by 
WHO20 in Table 1.
To classify errors, a meaningful approach is to consider what the reasonable intention was 
in the first place24. According to Reason24, errors can be classified as unintended slips and 
lapses. These occur when the plan is adequate but actions fail to go as planned. Slips are 
errors that typically occur at the task execution stage, in interrupted daily routine, which 
are observable. Lapses involve, generally, failure of memory. Reason notes, further, that 
errors that occur when actions go as planned, but the intended plan in not the correct, 
would be termed “mistakes”. 
Reason also uses the terms “active failures” and “latent conditions” when describing different 
types of errors. Active failures often occur in the “sharp end” of the system involving 
frontline personnel. These failures can, and often do, have immediate outcomes. Latent 
conditions related to the “blunt end” are present in all systems. Latent conditions arise from 
strategic and other top-level decisions, and tend to be removed from the direct control of 
the personnel. These decisions can, years later, in combination with local triggers, such as a 
high workload, create an adverse outcome24.
Errors can result in near misses, no-harm incidents or AEs, but these are not all preceded 
by an error. Error can be found in the active delivery of care, as in, doing something wrong 
(acts of commission) or failure to do the right thing (acts of omission)20 25-27. Errors are 
always found retrospectively18. 
12
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Table 1. Patient safety terms using WHO definitions20
Terms Definitions
Patient safety The reduction of risk of unnecessary harm associated 
with healthcare to an acceptable minimum
Risk The probability that an incident will occur
Event Something that happens to or involves a patient 
Near miss An incident that did not reach the patient 
No harm incident An event reached a patient but no discernable harm 
resulted
Incident An event or circumstance that could have resulted in, 
or did result, in unnecessary harm to a patient 
Error A failure to carry out a planned action as intended or 
application of an incorrect plan
Harmful incident (adverse event) An incident that results in harm to a patient
Harm Impairment of structure or function of the body and/
or any deleterious effect arising there from, including 
disease, injury, suffering, disability and death, and 
may be physical, social or physiological
Healthcare associated harm Harm arising from or associated with plans and action 
taken during the provision of healthcare, rather than 
an underlying disease or injury
Preventable Being accepted by the community as avoidable in the 
particular set of circumstances 
Contributing factor A circumstance, action or influence that is thought to 
have played a part in the origin or development, or to 
increase the risk, of an incident 
There are many definitions of AE20. The most common definition (or similar) in 
epidemiological retrospective record review studies has been that an AE is “an unintended 
injury or complication which results in disability, death or prolonged hospital stay and is 
caused by health care management rather than the patient’s disease”26. It is important to 
distinguish between adverse outcome as a result of healthcare management from those 
arising from morbidity and mortality due to the patients underlying disease or condition11. 
AEs include complications, which are deemed as leading to harm but of low preventability9 
18. 
An AE can be classified as preventable or non-preventable. Some preventable AEs can be 
related to negligence, such as, “care that fall below the standard expected of the average 
physician, other provider, or institution”9 28 29; or to violation, including, “a deliberate 
deviation from operation procedure, standard or rule”20. A penicillin reaction in a patient 
with known allergy is considered a preventable AE if the physician does not ask the patient 
13
about allergy before prescription or does not look for or react to risk of hypersensitivity 
information in the patient record. On the other hand, if the patient takes an antibiotic for 
the first time, or has taken it before without any problem, it is considered non-preventable 
AE28. Judging what is preventable is often not clear-cut, and it may be difficult to distinguish 
between a preventable and non-preventable AE11.
Kjellén30 defines a safety information system as a “system that provides the information 
needed for decisions and signalling related to safety”. 
The patient record in which all documentation is made by healthcare personnel is referred 
to as the record in this thesis. 
Validity and reliability
Validity and reliability are important in the development of any new method. The validity 
and reliability also ought to be tested and evaluated when accepted methods are introduced 
in new contexts. The understanding of these terms is of value when evaluating different 
studies and data collecting methods used1.
Accurate is a synonym for valid31. A method is valid if it measures what it is intended to 
measure1. High validity implies high reliability. Validity in terms of the extent to which the 
method approximates the true value of identified incidents is difficult to address as there 
is no “gold standard” to measure against23 32. Screening tools are thus not expected to be 
completely accurate. There may always be false positive and false negative outcomes23.
Precise is a synonym for reliable31. The reliability of a method is its ability to consistently 
detect the same event in the same set of information1. High reliability does not guarantee 
high validity. 
Terms and definition
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methods to identify pAtient 
sAfety And quALity informAtion 
in heALthcAre
The focus of this thesis was to evaluate the capability of retrospective record review methods 
to identify patient safety and quality information in orthopaedic care. 
Donabedian has developed a model for measuring quality that is widely adopted in healthcare. 
This model also provides a framework for measuring safety within the healthcare system. 
The model consists of measures of structure (how care is organised, resources, equipment), 
process (what we do) and outcome (the effect of what we do). To be able to measure structure, 
process and outcome indicators different data collecting methods must be used33. These data 
collecting methods can be used to both identify safety and quality issues. The main focus in 
this thesis, however, will be on patient safety information.
Quality, risks and incidents in the healthcare system can be identified and measured by using 
different methods. Some methods are used routinely in the clinic and some are more used 
in research1. Some methods are focused towards the incident rates, while others address 
risks, contributing factors and causes18. Collecting data is the first step of an organisational 
learning process; and data collection is necessary to assess risks and incident rates, and to 
provide the basis to prioritise where to deploy resources and how to implement change, as 
well as to later monitor progress in patient safety outcomes34.
To measure patient safety and quality deficiencies, and to follow up on improvement 
initiatives is difficult. Much of our learning has come from individual clinical cases and 
not from aggregated data, the latter which may be needed to prioritise and evaluate safety 
efforts35. Healthcare systems in some cases do not have a quantitative safety information 
problem but, rather, the problem is of qualitative nature34 35. 
When different methods are used to collect information, the outcome is not easily 
comparable. Often, patient safety and quality information is collected at different levels in 
the healthcare system by different organisations. The resulting information can be difficult 
to organise and may not be collected in a manner that it can easily be integrated. Systematic 
analysis is difficult since different methods yield different information about incidents18. 
The measures are derived from different purposes, data collecting methods and dimension 
of care processes in patient care36. Some of the information is not easily accessible to 
healthcare leaders and clinicians, and the identification and dissemination of information 
is often delayed, which complicates matters. The knowledge of reliability and validity of 
different methods is often limited in relation to specific contexts23. In Sweden, we have few 
valid and reliable methods for identifying risks and incidents and measuring patient safety37-
40. Källberg et al.39 compared four incident reporting systems in Sweden and found several 
problems, including: differences in use of terms, variation of information details, problems 
with precision and presentation of data, lack of standardised system for classification and 
categorisations, and too many, complex and different reporting systems in use.
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Much effort has been invested in methods to identify risk and incidents. Measuring risks 
and incidents is more problematic than measuring other outcomes or processes within the 
healthcare sector because these must be understood in the context of the system within 
which they occur. To choose the most appropriate method(s) to meet the measurable goals 
that are set, leaders, clinicians and researchers must understand the strengths and limitations 
of different methods31.There has been much debate regarding which method is the most 
valid, reliable and feasible1.
A wide range of data collecting methods can be used in patient safety and quality work, 
some of which are discussed below. Those used in this thesis will be presented first, in more 
detail. Some other methods available to identify patient safety and quality information will 
be briefly described in the end of this section.
Structured record reView
Structured review of records is the most extensively used and studied method to identify 
AEs41 42. These may be conducted either prospectively or retrospectively. In this thesis the 
focus will be on the most used form, RRR. 
Two separate approaches are used for RRR: by the use of screening criteria, and by 
the use of triggers. Both have traditionally focused on harm, while measuring AE rate 
retrospectively.
The screening criteria, or triggers, that are used in the first stage of the review process can 
be explicit or implicit. The first stage is often carried out by trained nurses. An explicit 
screening criterion/trigger is precise and does not require specific assessment (e.g., death 
or readmission within 30 days). An implicit screening criterion or trigger requires more 
assessment and judgement, and is, perhaps, more difficult to apply to the specific assessment 
requirements of the user. For example, to determine “inappropriate discharge to home” or 
a “procedure complication”, additional assessment is necessary. In practice, explicit and 
implicit screening criteria respectively triggers are generally combined23. 
The second review stage, performed by physicians to judge what was found in stage 1, can, 
in general, also be either explicit or implicit. Here, explicit methods involve more objective 
application of some pre-determined criteria, events or specific types of AEs (e.g. wrong 
site surgery). The reviewer determines presence or absence of relevant criteria23 42 43. This 
method may be less dependent on expert judgement and may be more reliable; but, it may 
detect a less range of AEs due to narrow inclusion43. 
Reviewers make an expert judgement of the presence or absence of AEs when using 
implicit review. The review process is not constrained by pre-determined criteria. A series 
of structured questions guide the judgement as to the nature of the AE1 23. This method is less 
standardised, which may reduce reliability and require reviewer training, but its strength is 
that it may identify events and processes of diverse nature that are not generally identified 
by explicit methods43. Most epidemiological RRR AE studies have used this method9 13 26 27 
44-47.
Methods to identify patient safety and quality information in healthcare
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retrospective record review using screening criteria
Epidemiological RRR studies that employ screening criteria have been reported for a number 
of countries, on regional or/and national levels. These studies report AE rates and evaluate 
how effectively RRR can be used to identify healthcare-associated harm to patients. Near 
miss or no-harm incidents have generally not been included in these studies6 9 13 26 27 44 45. This 
method is mostly used in research and, conversely, not used as a local routine data collection 
method by personnel or for evaluating initiated patient safety interventions1.
The California Medical Insurance Feasibility Study 
The first, large-scale study of healthcare-related malpractice or harm was the CMIFS. Its two-
stage RRR was performed by using 20 screening criteria to screen 20,864 records of patients 
discharged during 1974 from 23 randomly selected acute care California hospitals6. 
This study was performed to evaluate if a system of no-fault compensation could be feasible 
and cost effective, in the context of rapidly increasing costs of malpractice insurance 
premiums, making malpractice insurance unaffordable for some medical profession 
specialities6. 
The incidence of potentially compensable events (PCE) was determined. A PCE was 
defined as “a temporary or permanent impairment of physical or mental function (including 
disfigurement) or economic loss in the absence of such impairment, which was caused by 
healthcare management”6. 
In this study, 970 patients were judged to be affected by a PCE (4.6 %). Ninety-four patients 
died as result of a PCE. Study authors concluded that 165 patients (0.79 % of all included 
patients) were affected by a PCE that the healthcare provider was legally liable for6. 
The methodology used in this study influenced the Harvard Medical Practice Study 
(HMPS).
The Harvard Medical Practice Study
The HMPS is a landmark epidemiological AE study and has become the model for 
subsequent, similar studies within the field. 
An AE was defined as an “injury that was caused by medical management (rather than 
the underlying disease) and that prolonged the hospitalisation, produced a disability at the 
time of discharge, or both”9. The HMPS and the later Utah and Colorado Study (UTCOS)48 
incorporated the narrower definition of “negligence”, rather than “preventability”, which 
came to be used in subsequent studies26. A negligent AE was defined as “an injury caused by 
the failure to meet standards reasonably expected of the average physician, other provider, 
or institution”28.
A two-stage record review was carried out on a random sample of 30,121 hospitalisations 
during 1984 in 51 acute care hospitals in the New York State. First, screening for one of 
18 screening criteria (modified from the CMIFS) performed by trained nurses or medical-
record administrators; and, second, implicit review by two physicians independently. 
An independent review by a physician-supervisor was performed if discrepancies in the 
identification of AEs were present between the reviewers9.
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The HMPS used a six-point causation and negligence scale. A score of ≥ 4 was regarded as 
being an AE resulting from healthcare management or being negligent. The HMPS used a 
different severity scale than was used for the CMIFS6 28. 
The state-wide AE incidence was estimated to 3.7 % of hospitalisations and 27.6 % of the 
AEs were due to negligence. AEs contributed to death in 13.6 % of the cases9.
The Utah and Colorado Study 
A second study was performed in the US, and served to investigate if the results from the 
HMPS were similar in other states, though using another time period. A random sample of 
15,000 discharges during 1992 from 28 hospitals was included48.
The AE and negligent definitions were the same as those used in the HMPS, as was the 
2-stage review process. In the UTCOS, nurses carried out the screening stage and only one 
physician performed the review. The UTCOS also used 18 screening criteria but changed 
two criteria that had been used in the HMPS. Only those AEs with the highest disability 
were included48.
The annual AE incident rate was estimated to 2.9 % of hospitalisations in both states. In 
Utah, 32.6 % of the AEs were deemed to be due to negligence, while the corresponding rate 
for Colorado was 27.4 %. Death occurred in, overall, 6.6 % of AEs48.
The Quality in Australian Health Care Study (QAHCS)
The previously described studies were performed by assessing AEs related to negligent 
practice in a malpractice litigation context. The HMPS initiated a debate about AEs and 
quality of care in other countries. Australia was the first country to perform a national AE 
study. This was the first record review study of AEs undertaken from a quality improvement 
perspective with the objective to improve patient safety1. 
A random sample of 14,179 admissions from 28 hospitals in two states during 1992 was 
included and reviewed in two stages, as in previous studies, but with some modifications26.
An AE was defined as “an unintended injury or complication which results in disability, 
death or prolongation of hospital stay, and is caused by health care management rather than 
the patient’s diseases”26.
Screening by trained nurses considered 18 screening criteria. These screening criteria were 
somewhat different to those used in the HMPS. Some screening criteria were rephrased (to 
a wider use) and some removed, but others were new. Positive cases were later reviewed 
independently by two medical officers. If the physicians disagreed they reviewed jointly 
again, presented their results for a third medical officer and reached consensus. Only the AE 
with the highest disability was included26.
A 6-point scale, similar to the negligence scale used in previous studies, was used to assess 
the preventability of an AE. Preventability was assessed as “an error in management due 
to failure to follow accepted practice at an individual or system level”, accepted practice 
being “the current level of expected performance for the average practitioner or system that 
Methods to identify patient safety and quality information in healthcare
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manages the condition in question”. The causation scale was close to that in the HMPS but 
the QAHCS used a lower threshold for assessing causation (≥ 2). The severity scale was 
slightly dissimilar, using a 5-point scale instead of a 6-point scale as in the HMPS26.
The QAHCS identified AEs in 16.6 % of admissions and, of these, 51 % were judged 
preventable. Most AEs resolved (77.1%) within 12 months but 4.9 % resulted in death. 
Orthopaedic AEs were common but judged to be less preventable than AEs identified in 
most other specialities26.
retrospective record review using trigger tools
The concept of a “trigger” was used by Classen et al.49 50 to describe an automated method 
using electronic triggers to detect potential adverse drug events. This method was found to 
be impractical in many settings due to costs and the requirement of customised software 
linkage to pharmacy databases51. Resar et al.21 describe the evaluation of different trigger 
tools that do not require computerised technology. 
The GTT methodology, developed in late 2003 and popularised by the Institute for 
Healthcare Improvement (IHI)25, is a method now used internationally for retrospective 
reviews in patient safety work primarily in acute care settings. The GTT was primarily 
designed as a measurement tool in clinical practice to estimate and track AE rates over 
time, extending beyond traditional incident reports; and GTT aims to measure the effect 
of safety interventions36 51-53. The GTT has spread from collaborative projects to large-
scale improvement initiatives, such as, IHI´s ”5-Million Lives Campaign” in late 2006 to 
promote prevention of AEs in the US25. Specialised trigger tools have been developed, both 
before and after the initiation of GTT for various specific clinical settings21 54-62. The GTT is 
intended to be a practical tool to improve the detection of AEs, not an approach to measure 
the incidence of AEs21.
The AE is defined as “unintended injury resulting from or contributed to by medical care 
that requires additional monitoring, treatment or hospitalisation, or that result in death”25 
and is a more inclusive definition than those used with HMPS methodology. 
The GTT includes 54 triggers to identify potential AEs, for example, “post-operative 
increase in troponin levels” or “admission to intensive care post-operatively”25. Record 
review has been criticised for being too expensive and time consuming to be used in routine 
situations21, therefore GTT restricts each primary reviewer to review the record for not 
more than 20 minutes. Primary reviewers, often registered nurses (RNs), are instructed to 
focus on their search for triggers, and not comprehensively read the record, as in the HMPS 
methodology. The review team discusses the findings together but the physician reviewer is 
the final arbitrator. The physician does not generally review the record but does authenticate 
consensus findings and the severity rating of the AE, as well as responds to questions from 
the primary reviewers25.
The GTT neither includes omissions nor seeks to determine the nature of AEs. The GTT 
also use another severity scale compared to the HMPS methodology25 63. All identified AEs 
are included, not only the most severe as opposed to many of the studies using the HMPS 
methodology25.
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The Swedish GTT version64 contains 53 triggers. The triggers “restraint use” in the care 
module and the use of the indefinite “other” as a choice in the medication module were 
excluded. A trigger, ”occurrence of any postoperative complication“, was added to the 
surgical module. The Swedish GTT version has included the same preventability scale as in 
the HMPS methodology13, in contrast to the origin GTT version25, which does not examine 
the preventability of an AE. 
AE rates between 14.6-40 % have been detected by using GTT51 52 54 65-68. 
Strengths and limitations
Retrospective record review is commonly used, uses available data31 and has been found to 
identify more AEs compared with many other methods16 22 69-78. Record review can be repeated 
over time and specific AE types can be targeted, not only the overall AE rate18. The AE 
occurrence, severity and preventability can be overestimated due to, for example, hindsight 
bias; but it can also be underestimated, due to, for example, incomplete documentation. 
Quality of documentation affects results, including the detection of active failures and 
latent conditions31. A hindsight bias may be present when the situation actually faced by 
the personnel is inevitable grossly simplified by the reviewers in retrospective. Also, if an 
outcome is known to be adverse, a hindsight bias may result in more critical review, leading 
to the erroneous detection of an artificially high AE rate18 79.
Studies have found that with RRR, inter-rater reliability is poor-to-moderate31. This could 
be due to several factors, including skills, clinical specialty, experiences and predetermined 
views held by the reviewers, as well as training or education in the methodology1 23. 
Criticism has been put on RRR as time consuming, expensive, weak on providing real-
time information, and that it is not possible to collect additional information not already 
documented in the records18 78. 
In the discussion part of the thesis RRR strengths and limitations will be further addressed. 
The validity of RRR is now widely accepted. Moreover, the methodology may be further 
developed by using information technology to search for patient safety information and the 
use of databases. Adaptations have been developed to counter limitations1. Olsen1 describes 
in her thesis development of a method named “real-time record review” that uses local 
personnel to perform review close to the patient’s discharge.
Table 2 displays differences between the HMPS methodology and the GTT.
Methods to identify patient safety and quality information in healthcare
20
Maria Unbeck
ta
bl
e 
2.
 A
n 
ov
er
vi
ew
 o
f t
he
 o
rig
in
s o
f t
he
 H
ar
va
rd
 M
ed
ic
al
 P
ra
ct
ic
e 
St
ud
y 
m
et
ho
d 
an
d 
th
e 
G
lo
ba
l T
rig
ge
r T
oo
l
O
rig
in
 a
nd
 p
er
sp
ec
tiv
e
D
efi
ni
tio
n/
in
cl
us
io
n 
an
d 
m
et
ho
d 
of
 re
vi
ew
 
R
ev
ie
w
 s
ta
ge
 1
R
ev
ie
w
 s
ta
ge
 2
C
rit
er
io
n/
tri
gg
er
Sa
m
pl
e 
si
ze
 a
nd
 ti
m
e 
fra
m
e 
fo
r i
nc
lu
si
on
H
ar
va
rd
 M
ed
ic
al
 
Pr
ac
tic
e 
St
ud
y(
H
PM
S)
9 
28
 
29
 w
ith
 s
ub
se
qu
en
t 
m
od
ifi
ca
tio
ns
13
 2
6 
27
 
44
-4
7  
M
ed
ic
ol
eg
al
 a
nd
 
fo
cu
s 
on
 n
eg
lig
en
ce
 
th
e 
fir
st
 s
tu
di
es
 a
nd
 
th
er
ea
fte
r q
ua
lit
y 
im
pr
ov
em
en
t a
nd
 
pr
ev
en
ta
bi
lit
y 
pe
rs
pe
ct
iv
e
R
es
ea
rc
h 
m
et
ho
d
An
 u
ni
nt
en
de
d 
in
ju
ry
 
or
 c
om
pl
ic
at
io
n 
th
at
 
re
su
lts
 in
 d
is
ab
ilit
y 
at
 
di
sc
ha
rg
e,
 d
ea
th
 o
r 
pr
ol
on
ge
d 
ho
sp
ita
l 
st
ay
 a
nd
 is
 c
au
se
d 
by
 h
ea
lth
ca
re
 
m
an
ag
em
en
t r
at
he
r 
th
an
 th
e 
pa
tie
nt
’s
 
un
de
rly
in
g 
di
se
as
e
In
cl
ud
es
 b
ot
h 
om
is
si
on
 
an
d 
co
m
m
is
si
on
 
Ad
ul
t, 
in
pa
tie
nt
s,
 
of
te
n 
ex
cl
us
io
n 
of
 
e.
g.
 p
sy
ch
ia
tri
c 
an
d 
re
ha
bi
lit
at
io
n 
pa
tie
nt
s 
Tw
o9
 2
6   
- t
hr
ee
13
 4
6   
st
ag
e 
re
tro
sp
ec
tiv
e 
re
co
rd
 re
vi
ew
G
en
er
al
ly
 o
ne
 re
vi
ew
er
 
pe
r r
ec
or
d
Sc
re
en
in
g 
fo
r o
ne
 o
f 
18
 c
rit
er
ia
 b
y 
tra
in
ed
 
nu
rs
es
 (c
an
 b
e 
ot
he
r 
pr
of
es
si
on
al
s)
C
om
pr
eh
en
si
ve
 re
ad
in
g 
N
o 
as
se
ss
m
en
t, 
ge
ne
ra
lly
 o
nl
y 
re
gi
st
ra
tio
n 
of
 fo
un
d 
cr
ite
ria
, d
es
cr
ip
tio
n 
of
 
th
e 
po
te
nt
ia
l A
E,
 a
nd
 
a 
br
ie
f s
um
m
ar
y 
of
 th
e 
ad
m
is
si
on
N
o 
tim
e 
lim
it
M
os
tly
 tw
o 
ph
ys
ic
ia
n 
re
vi
ew
er
s 
pe
r r
ec
or
d
D
et
ai
le
d 
in
de
pe
nd
en
t r
ev
ie
w
As
se
ss
 th
e 
AE
 b
y 
us
in
g 
di
ffe
re
nt
 s
ca
le
s 
ac
co
rd
in
g 
to
 e
.g
. c
au
sa
tio
n,
 s
ev
er
ity
, 
pr
ev
en
ta
bi
lit
y,
 ti
m
in
g,
 
ca
us
es
, a
nd
 ty
pe
s
G
en
er
al
ly
 in
cl
ud
es
 o
nl
y 
on
e 
AE
 p
er
 p
at
ie
nt
 i.
e.
 th
e 
m
os
t 
se
ve
re
 
N
o 
tim
e 
lim
it
G
en
er
al
 fo
r b
ot
h 
m
et
ho
ds
: 
An
 in
di
ca
tio
n 
th
at
 p
at
ie
nt
 
ha
rm
 m
ay
 h
av
e 
oc
cu
rre
d
D
ire
ct
s 
th
e 
m
ed
ic
al
 
re
vi
ew
er
 to
 re
le
va
nt
 p
ar
ts
 
of
 th
e 
re
co
rd
s 
by
 th
e 
no
te
s
So
m
e 
sc
re
en
in
g 
cr
ite
ria
/tr
ig
ge
rs
 a
re
 
A
E
s 
by
 d
efi
ni
tio
n 
e.
g.
 
he
al
th
ca
re
-a
ss
oc
ia
te
d 
in
fe
ct
io
ns
Po
si
tiv
e 
sc
re
en
in
g 
cr
ite
ria
/tr
ig
ge
rs
 m
ay
 b
e 
w
ith
ou
t c
on
ne
ct
io
n 
to
 
pa
tie
nt
 h
ar
m
 i.
e.
 fa
ls
e 
po
si
tiv
e
H
M
PS
 m
et
ho
d:
18
 m
os
tly
 im
pl
ic
it 
cr
ite
ria
 
R
an
do
m
, b
ig
 s
am
pl
es
 to
 
m
ea
su
re
 th
e 
in
ci
de
nc
e 
an
d 
to
 g
en
er
al
is
e 
th
e 
re
su
lt 
An
 A
E 
ha
d 
to
 h
av
e 
oc
cu
rre
d 
be
fo
re
 a
nd
 
du
rin
g 
an
d 
de
te
ct
ed
 
du
rin
g 
an
d/
or
 a
fte
r i
nd
ex
 
ad
m
is
si
on
D
iff
er
en
t i
nc
lu
si
on
 
pe
rio
ds
 b
ef
or
e 
an
d 
af
te
r 
in
de
x 
ad
m
is
si
on
21
O
rig
in
 a
nd
 p
er
sp
ec
tiv
e
D
efi
ni
tio
n/
in
cl
us
io
n 
an
d 
m
et
ho
d 
of
 re
vi
ew
 
R
ev
ie
w
 s
ta
ge
 1
R
ev
ie
w
 s
ta
ge
 2
C
rit
er
io
n/
tri
gg
er
Sa
m
pl
e 
si
ze
 a
nd
 ti
m
e 
fra
m
e 
fo
r i
nc
lu
si
on
G
lo
ba
l t
rig
ge
r 
to
ol
25
 8
0
Q
ua
lit
y 
im
pr
ov
em
en
t t
oo
l 
fo
r c
lin
ic
al
 p
ra
ct
ic
e
Tr
ac
k 
AE
 ra
te
 o
ve
r 
tim
e 
in
 a
 h
os
pi
ta
l o
r 
a 
cl
in
ic
U
ni
nt
en
de
d 
in
ju
ry
 
re
su
lti
ng
 fr
om
 o
r 
co
nt
rib
ut
ed
 to
 b
y 
m
ed
ic
al
 c
ar
e 
th
at
 
re
qu
ire
s 
ad
di
tio
na
l 
m
on
ito
rin
g,
 tr
ea
tm
en
t 
or
 h
os
pi
ta
lis
at
io
n,
 o
r 
th
at
 re
su
lts
 in
 d
ea
th
 
In
cl
ud
es
 c
om
m
is
si
on
, 
ex
cl
ud
es
 o
m
is
si
on
Ad
ul
t, 
in
pa
tie
nt
s,
 
ex
cl
us
io
n 
of
 
ps
yc
hi
at
ric
 a
nd
 
re
ha
bi
lit
at
io
n 
pa
tie
nt
s 
Tw
o 
st
ag
e 
re
tro
sp
ec
tiv
e 
re
co
rd
 
re
vi
ew
 
Tw
o 
re
vi
ew
er
s 
pe
r 
re
co
rd
Fi
rs
t s
cr
ee
ni
ng
 
in
de
pe
nd
en
tly
 fo
r 
on
e 
of
 5
4 
tri
gg
er
s 
by
 
tra
in
ed
 n
ur
se
s 
(c
an
 b
e 
ot
he
r p
ro
fe
ss
io
na
ls
), 
fo
cu
s 
on
 tr
ig
ge
rs
, 
no
 c
om
pr
eh
en
si
ve
 
re
ad
in
g,
 re
ad
s 
ju
st
 
re
le
va
nt
 p
ar
ts
 re
la
te
d 
to
 
fo
un
d 
tri
gg
er
s;
 s
ec
on
d,
 
co
ns
en
su
s
Fi
nd
s 
tri
gg
er
s,
 
de
sc
rib
es
 th
e 
po
te
nt
ia
l 
AE
, a
nd
 c
at
eg
or
is
e 
ha
rm
 a
cc
or
di
ng
 to
 N
C
C
 
M
ER
P 
in
de
x
N
o 
as
se
ss
m
en
t o
f 
pr
ev
en
ta
bi
lit
y
M
ax
im
um
 2
0 
m
in
ut
es
 
pe
r r
ec
or
d
Th
e 
te
am
 d
is
cu
ss
 th
e 
fin
di
ng
s 
to
ge
th
er
 
O
ne
 p
hy
si
ci
an
, w
ho
 d
oe
s 
no
t g
en
er
al
ly
 re
vi
ew
 th
e 
re
co
rd
 b
ut
 d
oe
s 
au
th
en
tic
at
e 
th
e 
co
ns
en
su
s 
fin
di
ng
s 
of
 
th
e 
AE
s,
 th
e 
se
ve
rit
y 
ra
tin
g,
 
an
d 
an
sw
er
 q
ue
st
io
ns
 fr
om
 
re
vi
ew
er
s 
in
 re
vi
ew
 s
ta
ge
 1
Th
e 
ph
ys
ic
ia
n 
is
 th
e 
fin
al
 
ar
bi
tra
to
r
A
ll 
id
en
tifi
ed
 A
E
s 
ar
e 
in
cl
ud
ed
 
N
o 
tim
e 
lim
it
Th
e 
Sw
ed
is
h 
ve
rs
io
n 
in
cl
ud
es
 th
e 
sa
m
e 
pr
ev
en
ta
bi
lit
y 
sc
al
e 
as
 
us
ed
 in
 th
e 
H
M
PS
 
m
et
ho
do
lo
gy
13
 2
6 
64
54
 tr
ig
ge
rs
, m
os
tly
 e
xp
lic
it
Th
e 
Sw
ed
is
h 
ve
rs
io
n6
4  
co
nt
ai
ns
 5
3 
tri
gg
er
s,
 th
e 
tri
gg
er
s 
“re
st
ra
in
t u
se
” 
in
 th
e 
ca
re
 m
od
ul
e 
an
d 
“o
th
er
” i
n 
th
e 
m
ed
ic
at
io
n 
m
od
ul
e 
w
er
e 
ex
cl
ud
ed
, 
an
d 
a 
tri
gg
er
, ”
oc
cu
rre
nc
e 
of
 a
ny
 p
os
to
pe
ra
tiv
e 
co
m
pl
ic
at
io
n“
, w
as
 a
dd
ed
 
in
 th
e 
su
rg
ic
al
 m
od
ul
e
R
an
do
m
, s
m
al
l s
am
pl
es
 
su
ffi
ci
en
t f
or
 th
e 
de
si
gn
 
of
 s
af
et
y 
w
or
k 
ov
er
 ti
m
e
10
 re
co
rd
s 
ev
er
y 
se
co
nd
 
w
ee
k 
or
 2
0 
re
co
rd
s 
ev
er
y 
m
on
th
 p
er
 h
os
pi
ta
l
Le
ng
th
 o
f s
ta
y 
at
 le
as
t 2
4 
ho
ur
s
An
 A
E 
ha
d 
to
 h
av
e 
oc
cu
rre
d 
be
fo
re
 a
nd
 
du
rin
g 
an
d 
de
te
ct
ed
 
du
rin
g 
an
d/
or
 a
fte
r i
nd
ex
 
ad
m
is
si
on
30
 d
ay
s 
in
cl
us
io
n 
pe
rio
d 
be
fo
re
 a
nd
 a
fte
r i
nd
ex
 
ad
m
is
si
on
N
C
C
 M
ER
P,
 N
at
io
na
l C
oo
rd
in
at
io
n 
C
ou
nc
il 
fo
r M
ed
ic
at
io
n 
Er
ro
r R
ep
or
tin
g 
an
d 
Pr
ev
en
tio
n 
(N
C
C
 M
ER
P)
 in
de
x6
3 . 
C
at
eg
or
y 
A-
D
 d
es
cr
ib
es
 ri
sk
 a
nd
 n
o 
ha
rm
 in
ci
de
nt
. C
at
eg
or
y 
E-
I d
es
cr
ib
es
 h
ar
m
.
Methods to identify patient safety and quality information in healthcare
22
Maria Unbeck
incident rePortinG SySteMS
A reporting system refers to the processes and technology involved in the standardisation, 
formatting, communication, feedback, analysis, learning, response, and dissemination of 
lessons learned from the reported risks and incidents42. The scope of an incident reporting 
system may vary greatly. Some collect data about risks and incidents, while others are 
concerned with only severe incidents41. 
Leape81 describes the characteristics of a successful reporting system, effectively part of 
a safety information system, as being non-punitive, maintains confidentiality, operates 
independently from of any authority with power to punish, contains a provision for expert 
analysis, is timely, is system-oriented and is responsive. Vincent18 also argues that the system 
must be easy to use.
There are several incident reporting systems in use at local, regional and national levels in 
Sweden, used both by healthcare provider and personnel, and by patients and their relatives. 
These methods will be described in general and, then, overall strengths and limitations will 
be discussed.
incident reporting systems for healthcare providers and personnel
Clinical incident reporting system
Our healthcare system has learned from other high-risk industries, leading to implementation 
of clinical incident reporting systems, which are now widely used but with variable success1 
18.
Systems for self-reporting of incidents by personnel can be designed to be mandatory or 
voluntary18. In Sweden, since 1996, it is mandatory for healthcare personnel to report risks 
and incidents. In the current statute82, healthcare personnel are required to report risk for 
preventable AEs, as well as events that have led to or might have led to a preventable AE. 
Clinical incident reporting systems vary between the numerous, different County Councils 
and regions.
Lex Maria 
All Swedish healthcare provider organisations must urgently report all serious preventable 
AEs, or the risk thereof, also called “sentinel events”, to the National Board of Health and 
Welfare, a government agency under the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs, according 
to the lex Maria statute83 84. This statute was established in 1937 after a medical error was 
blamed for four deaths at Maria Hospital in Stockholm. The statute has been revised over the 
years, and since 2006, includes suicide in relation to care. Of late, lex Maria has been noted 
to focus more on system failures83 84. The number of lex Maria reports has been increasing 
steadily, from 905 in 2000, to 2,124 in 201037 40. 
Medical Product Agency 
The Medical Product Agency statutes require that all healthcare provider organisations 
urgently report any serious as well as unintended side effects caused or associated with 
medical products. Also, reporting is required on side effects which are increasing in 
frequency85 86. Serious incidents concerning medical technical products require urgent 
report to both the Medical Product Agency and the manufacturer87 88. 
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incident reporting systems for patients and relatives
Patient ombudsman or direct contact with the healthcare provider
In the first instance, the patient or relative is recommended to contact the healthcare provider 
in question by phone, e-mail or post if they have opinions about healthcare, noting that the 
provider has an obligation to investigate89. If problems arise, some hospitals have a patient 
ombudsman who serves as an impartial link between involved parties. Information from 
patients and relatives may provide valuable safety information90.
County Councils` Mutual Insurance Company
Sweden like the other Nordic countries has a blame-free and non-tort national patient 
insurance system. According to the Patient Injury Act91 a patient or a relative can file a 
malpractice claim to request compensation for injury in relation to healthcare. All Swedish 
County Councils and regions contribute economically to the insurance. Only injuries deemed 
preventable by an external medical specialist reviewer are compensated. The patients must 
report an injury within three years from when the patient became aware of the injury, and it 
must be within ten years of the occurrence. 
Some 10,000 injuries are reported each year and about 45% of these are compensated92. 
Economical compensation is paid for disability, income loss, expenses, inconvenience as 
well as pain and suffering93. Claim rates vary significantly between specialities. Surgical 
specialities, especially orthopaedics, have the highest claim rates94 95. In the Nordic countries, 
lawsuits are very rare. 
National Board of Health and Welfare
When the Patient Safety Act82 was launched in January, 2011, the National Board of Health 
and Welfare took over the management of patient complaints from the Medical Responsibility 
Board (HSAN). Patients and their relatives can make complaints about an event, an individual 
personnel or a healthcare provider. The National Board of Health and Welfare has adopted a 
systematic approach for investigating complaints. They may initiate inspections in the same 
way as in lex Maria investigations. Healthcare providers or personnel may be criticised. 
Individual personnel may have licenses revoked. Supervision may be required. Patients 
must generally report the event within two years from the occurrence89. 
Patients´ Advisory Committee 
A patient’s advisory resource exists in every County Council and region. The Patients´ 
Advisory Committee is a central and independent authority to which patients or relatives 
can turn to when they have difficulties in contacting or addressing complaints concerning all 
public financed healthcare. The Patients´ Advisory Committee helps the patient to investigate 
what happened, propose solutions, inform and guide the patient further, if necessary, to 
the proper healthcare personnel, provider or authorities. However, the Patients´ Advisory 
Committee has no authority to award damages or to punish. The central aim is to improve 
healthcare services by reporting complaints and suggestions from the patients to different 
providers96.
Strengths and limitations with incident reporting systems
National and regional reporting systems may identify rare or serious events, and unforeseen 
consequences not previously identified by local incident reporting systems. Their value is 
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based on learning from other’s experience1 18 42 97; but local systems can often collect more 
detailed data about local problems1. The experiences and observations made by patients and 
their relatives are important for healthcare in the patient safety work. Due to little overlap 
between the different reporting systems, data that is not available by other measures can 
be identified by using patient reported data38 78 98-104. Clinical incident reporting systems, 
besides providing data, may be essential to establish a positive patient safety culture and to 
raise awareness in these issues18. One advantage with incident reporting is that the method 
is always operational, accessible for all personnel within the healthcare organisation1.
Some incident reporting systems, especially the national systems, have a time delay for 
reporting, processing and giving feedback105. Incident reporting systems are also biased 
by a high level of underreporting, selective reporting and hindsight bias31. The source 
of bias may vary over time, amongst personnel, specialities and hospitals; and by event 
type and severity35. Due to underreporting, some argue that data from incident reporting 
systems may be unreliable as a measure of patient safety and to evaluate the effect in patient 
safety initiatives31 35 41 97 106. These reports may increase learning and, in sufficient number, 
they can serve to identify improvement areas23 41. These reporting systems may need to be 
supplemented by other more systematic data collection methods71.
wHy are rePortinG rateS So low and wHat affectS tHe 
rePortinG willinGneSS? 
The underreporting, as mentioned earlier, applies to both mandatory and voluntary reporting 
systems and is well documented16 22 54 66 70 71 75 77 95 100 103 107-109. With incident reporting systems 
healthcare providers and personnel are obliged to report according to statute82. Patients and 
their relatives can use incident reporting systems to report deficiencies within the healthcare 
system. What are the reasons for such underreporting?
Personnel
Completeness of clinical incident reports depends on the willingness to report110. Personnel 
must commit to report or not, and factors which influence this may vary between individuals 
and professionals1 111. Several barriers to clinical incident reporting are described in the 
literature, including: lack of time, interruptions in workflow, the safety culture or lack of, 
lack of knowledge and uncertainty as to what constitutes an incident, fear of litigation or 
disciplinary actions, difficulties to report, lack of feedback and a sense that reporting will 
not result in any improvement11 18 97 103 112-115. That nurses tend to report more incidents than 
physicians is well reported112 116-120. Curiously, physicians report more serious incidents but 
are less likely to report fatal events117. Noble and Pronovost106 argue that such participation 
bias hinders the ability to identify and reduce specific risks mostly viewed by physicians and 
may misdirect interventions. This might also give an incorrect picture of incidents occurring 
in different care processes and, consequently, with such a bias, the pattern of incidents cannot 
be generalised.
Patients and relatives
Patients and their relatives are an obvious source of AE reporting data, though subgroups, for 
example, by age, have variable reporting characteristics. Studies have shown that patients 
identify care-related AEs correctly98 121 122. Traditionally, patient reports of AEs have been 
collected, and exploited, by complaint- and claim-reporting systems, which, unfortunately, 
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underestimate the incident rate78 103. Bismark et al.103 found that severe and preventable AEs 
have a greater likelihood to be lodged as a compliant. The elderly are a high risk group for 
AEs27 75 123-125; but, they are found to be the least likely to make complaints103 126. Possible 
reasons why patients do not report incidents can be several, including: lack of awareness for 
having sustained an AE, thinking that the incident is a known unpreventable complication 
or may be due to the underlying disease; advanced sickness; lack of knowledge that one 
can make a complaint or malpractice claim; and unwillingness or not sensing the need 
to report78. Having negative experiences were found to affect the patients´ perception of 
trust and safety in healthcare negatively100 126, which may affect the reporting rate100. In the 
latter study, conducted in Sweden, they investigated reasons for not filing complaints and 
identified the main barriers to reporting. They found that patients did not find the strength 
to report, did not know where to turn and believed that a complaint would not make any 
difference. 
Healthcare providers
Öhrn et al.95 found that in Sweden, severe AEs were widely underreported despite the 
mandatory reporting statute, lex Maria83 84. This may be due to many of these events 
being regarded as complications by physicians. Indeed, the senior chief medical officers’ 
disagreements described in this study report, concerning what should be reported, indicates 
that the statute, itself, is not clear-cut.
otHer data collectinG MetHodS
According to Swedish statutes, healthcare providers are obliged to analyse why incidents 
occur and how serious they are, rather than target blame. The aim is to achieve quality 
in systems concerning patient safety work in order to achieve a reduction of preventable 
AEs82 127. Several analytic methods are described in the literature. The methods most 
widely used in Sweden, as well as internationally, are the Healthcare Failure Mode Effect 
Analysis (HFMEA) and the Root Cause Analysis (RCA)128. These methods can lead to 
deep understanding of current weaknesses, contributing factors, future potential safety 
problems, maintain a system approach and lead to organisational and local learning 
in order to prevent reoccurrence. The RCA may be affected by recall bias, which may 
increase over time18 23 129. The HFMEA and the RCA tend to focus on severe outcome, 
require extensive resources and may be dependent on standardisation and education in 
methodology to provide valid and reliable results18 41 129. 
Since 1975, several quality registers, including across a wide range of specialist areas and 
diagnoses, have been established in Sweden (89 registers in 2011). A register contains 
individualised data concerning patient problems, medical interventions, and outcomes 
after treatment. The vision for the quality registries is to constitute an over-all knowledge 
system that is actively used on all levels for continuous learning, quality improvement 
and management of all healthcare services. Data is submitted from participated units and 
patients/relatives and is stored in central databases130. Aggregate data is available by these 
registers and epidemiological research can be performed37. Note, however, that validity and 
reliability within and between the registers and other methods may vary99 131.
Administrative data sources, data often derived from the patient administrative system are 
used to identify patient safety information and are commonly used in the US. Administrative 
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data may contain relevant information but these are not established for the purpose of 
measure safety or quality18. Advantages are availability, low cost, digitally compiled, and 
broad population coverage. This method is also less susceptible to selection bias than some 
other methods e.g. incident reporting but has limited clinical data and may be incomplete 
due to inaccuracy and variability of coding practices which affects reliability, for example, 
primary and secondary medical diagnosis31 132 133. Michel41 suggests these data be used for 
screening proposes and not to measure patient safety.
Information technology applications and methods are increasingly used to identify and 
provide feedback about incidents. Information technology enables digitised and automated 
data filtering, searching, counting, and so on. These functions can be used to search 
multiple, large data sets to focus on specific AEs, e.g., healthcare-associated infections41 134. 
The information technology approach can be costly and no standardised method exists to 
guide examination of data, and reliability is limited31 41. ”Drilling down” into data sets using 
generic information technology may also not enable one to detect latent conditions31. 
Mortality and morbidity (M&M) conferences are one of the oldest methods to examine 
AE issues. When used for internal evaluation, M&M conferences remain an important 
resource and are accepted, especially within surgical specialties1. Thomas and Petersen31 
report that M&M conferences can detect active failures and latent conditions but are limited 
by hindsight bias. The selection for conference cases is biased towards severe AEs, while 
cases that led to minor AEs, which constitute the majority, are often not presented. Olsen1 
cautions of the risk of poor analysis of events that misses complex contributing factors, and 
promotes individual blame. The reliability is likely to be variable due to several factors e.g. 
the objective, case selection, and the attendance of personnel1 41. 
Interviews and questionnaires can be valuable methods to detect incidents, active failures 
and contributing factors and can provide detailed data not otherwise available23 42 135. 
Interview as a method has pedagogical and communicative advantages, and could be more 
routinely used in continuous patient safety improvement69. Interview, however, does not 
provide data about trends42. Interviews are resource intensive97. Recall bias may also be of 
concern. Interviews and questionnaires used with different personnel categories may lead to 
different reporting of incidents23 135. For valid and reliable results, trained interviewers and 
validated questionnaires are needed. 
Observation or videotaping may increase the understanding about the processes and 
dynamics that affect the outcome and identify solutions on safety problems42. Michel41 
describes some advantages with these methods, which are not as influenced by willingness 
to report, memory, ability to communicate or subject’s level of knowledge concerning errors. 
Other advantages are that these can be performed prospectively97 and may be more sensitive 
to detect active failures than other methods31. However, observation may be costly, labour 
intensive and presents practical difficulties1. Thomas and Petersen31 describe further some of 
the limitations with observation, such as, that it is time-intensive to train reliable observers, 
concern of confidentially, hindsight bias and the fact that personnel may alter their normal 
behaviour when knowing they are observed, known also as the Hawthorne effect. 
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Clinical surveillance, often used in epidemiological studies, could be effective to assess 
explicit incidents. The methodology may be costly and less useful in detecting contextual 
information on latent conditions due to the focus on specific outcomes or elements of care at 
a specific time and place rather than the full range of incidents31. Traditionally used outcome 
studies seldom separate events due to healthcare management from those resulting from the 
patient’s underlying disease136. 
WalkRounds is a management tool, introduced in the US in 2000 by Allan Frankel, to sustain 
good relations with frontline personnel, promote conversations to identify incidents, and 
gather safety information to enhance decision making around patient safety in order to take 
appropriate action and to support the safety culture137. Since its introduction the method 
has been adopted and modified in a number of different countries138. The identified data 
can neither be used to estimate AE rates nor evaluate the AE reduction after patient safety 
initiatives; but, the effect on patient safety culture can be measured and this method is low-
cost and easy to carry out42.
An overview of the different data collecting methods is presented in Table 3.
Table 3. Overview of different patient safety information methods´ strengths and 
limitations
Methods Strengths Limitations
Record review Use already available data
Valid compared to most other 
methods
Can yield detailed information
Can detect active failures if adequate 
documentation
Can estimate prevalence and 
incidence
Can be used to assess the efficacy of 
interventions
Rely on documentation quality
Hindsight bias
Reliability concerns
Resource extensive for continuously use or 
on large scale 
Incident 
reporting 
systems
Some can detect latent conditions
Provide multiple perspectives over 
time 
Can be run as a routine
Can detect rare incidents (regional/
national reporting systems)
Unreliable as a measure of patient safety 
Difficult to generalise 
Unreliable to evaluate interventions
Reporting bias
Hindsight bias
Report propensity may vary between groups 
and over time
Lex Maria and patient claims are focused on 
severe events in accordance with the statutes´ 
purpose
Timeliness
HFMEA and 
RCA
Can yield detailed information 
Can suggest latent conditions and 
future problems
Resource extensive
Reliability and validity of the conclusions 
Recall bias (RCA)
Hindsight bias (RCA)
Tend to focus on severe outcome
Methods to identify patient safety and quality information in healthcare
Table 3 continues on page 28.
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National quality 
registers
Nation-wide comparison possible
Provide data for QI and healthcare 
planning
Epidemiological data
Timely feedback
Data quality and coverage may differ between 
registers and within registers
Focusing on complications
Administrative 
data including 
information 
technology (IT) 
Utilises readily available data
Inexpensive (after initial investments, 
IT)
Routinely collected
Less susceptible to selection bias
Can screen big populations
May use real-time monitoring (IT)
Integrates multiple data sources (IT)
Affects by incomplete or inaccurate data 
Data divorced from clinical context
Not good at detecting latent conditions
Expensive (initial IT investments)
Sensitive to programming, data entry errors 
and/or incomplete/not standardised data (IT)
Morbidity 
and Mortality 
conferences 
Familiar and acceptable to especially 
surgeons
Can suggest latent conditions
Hindsight bias
Selection bias
Infrequently utilised
Focus on rare events
Often poor analysis
Risk of individual blame
Interview and 
questionnaire 
May provide data otherwise 
unavailable Can yield detailed 
information
Can suggest active failures and latent 
conditions
Recall bias
Expensive (interviews)
Needs trained interviewers and 
validated questionnaires 
Observation Provide data otherwise unavailable
Detects active failures 
Can yield detailed information
Prospective method
Expensive
Difficult to train reliable observers
Potential Hawthorne effect
Logistical problems
Poor at detecting latent conditions
Potential hindsight bias
Potential concerns about confidentially
Possible to be overwhelmed with information
Clinical 
surveillance 
Potential valid and reliable
Prospective
Used to measure explicit defined events
Time consuming and expensive
Not good for detecting latent conditions
WalkRounds Management commitment
Supports safety culture 
Can detect latent conditions
Low-cost
Reporting bias
Non-standardised source of data
Adapted and further developed from18 31 41.
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LeArning from And Acting 
upon sAfety informAtion
A better understanding of the frequency, nature and contributing factors of specific incidents 
is a first step to preventing reoccurrence. But measurement alone does not lead to safer 
healthcare; the incidents must be accurately analysed, lessons learned and appropriate action 
taken23 42. 
Modern safety research defines safety existing within a system, not as the absence of 
risks and incidents. Safety concerns the system’s capability to deal with vulnerabilities 
and risks so that they do not harm, for example, personnel, equipment or patients. Other 
industries, such as aviation and nuclear power industry, have gone far beyond the healthcare 
services in efforts to develop systems to monitor and improve safety. These are called high 
reliability organisations. Experience has shown these industries that organisations need 
safety information systems that collect, analyse and feedback information about risks and 
incidents to the organisation, and that learning must take place to improve safety. Such 
systems combine information about risks and incidents with decades of analyses that 
generated knowledge about specific risks and incidents and actions taken30. Well-developed 
system to measure and monitor patient safety within the healthcare system is still limited30 
139. One difference between incidents in the healthcare systems, and the high reliability 
organisations, is that severe incidents in healthcare usually affect one patient at a time and 
are less visible and harm happens to a third part, compared to an airplane crash with hundreds 
of deaths including the crew10.
Safety information systems provide data that can facilitate decision making at different 
levels of the healthcare system, which aim to improve safety and quality. Ideally, safety 
information systems provide real-time information78. Kjellén30 describes the requirements 
for an effective safety information system, including: that the data collection should be 
valid, reliable and provide adequate coverage; information should have relevance, be timely, 
be comprehensive but also easy to gather and available when needed; that methods used 
should be easily understood and accepted; that involvement be promoted and encouraged 
involvement; and that it should be cost-effective. 
WHO42 concludes that the healthcare system finds it difficult to learn from incidents and 
disseminate lessons learned to a wider audience, for example, making available data that 
may be used to formulate recommendations for system changes.
No-harm incidents and near miss are events that are often overseen, though there is potential 
for harm under other circumstances. Also, learning from these events could lead to more 
proactive change in patient safety initiatives1. Kaplan and Fastman140 suggest that such 
events are a valuable source of patient safety information because of their similarity to, and 
greater frequency than, events causing harm to patients. No-harm incidents and near miss 
simply are an increased risk of harm but allow that some form of recovery took place, either 
by chance or by actions of an individual, team, or organisation before harm could occur. 
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Analysis of these events gives opportunity for better understanding of recovery mechanisms, 
in addition to what contributing factors are. Also, these constitute a low cost learning tool 
for safety compared with events where the patient is actually harmed34 141 142. 
tHe wiMMera clinical riSk ManaGeMent Model
At the Wimmera Base Hospital, in rural Australia, the Wimmera Clinical Risk Management 
Model has been in use since 1989, one which incorporates a systematic, on-going approach 
for patient safety. It consists of five basic, sequential and coordinated components: multi-
method AE identification tools; analysis; determination and prioritising risk of each AE; 
initiate interventions and finally monitoring the effects of these77 143.
In the Wimmera Clinical Risk Management Model, an AE is defined as “an untoward patient 
event, which under optimal conditions is not a natural consequence of the patient’s disease 
or treatment”. All identified AEs are included in the review process77.
Their review process differs from those used in other studies using screening criteria. Manual 
screening is performed on all medical records closely after patients have been discharged. 
Eight (later nine) explicit screening criteria were chosen in order to be easily and accurately 
used by non-clinical personnel as a part of their normal duties. A positive record in the 
screening process was then reviewed by a senior medical personnel using a standardised 
assessment. The AEs were, after the physician review, discussed by a surveillance committee 
comprised of personnel from a cross section of different clinical professions, and whose task 
was to identify situations that should be regarded as warranting implementation of measures 
for patient safety77. Some of the screening criteria are the same as in the HMPS methodology28. 
As opposed to the HMPS methodology, the Wimmera Clinical Risk Management Model 
uses the screening criteria obtained locally and continuously. They have also a different 
review process, using an AE definition that identifies a wider range of events and have some 
other assessments scales e.g. the severity scale143 144.
In the Wimmera Clinical Risk Management Model, other systems of reporting AEs have 
also been implemented. For example, clinical incident reporting and general practitioner 
feedback on AEs are used. These reporting systems are intended to complement each other. 
The method is not built to identify all AEs, as is GTT, but to find enough to form a basis for 
intervention. The rate of AEs over time is measured and the effectiveness of implementation 
of interventions. This is a part of their routine, longitudinal safety measurements77. 
Evaluation of the Wimmera Clinical Risk Management Model found the annual AE rate 
decreased from 1.35 % for all discharged patients to 0.74 % after interventions between the 
first and eighth year when77. 
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WhAt cAn this thesis  
Add to the fieLd?
When we started to plan our first study in the spring 2004, a limited number of terms and 
definitions were available in Sweden within the patient safety field. No RRR examining the 
occurrence of AEs had been performed in Sweden. Traditionally, prospective studies within 
surgery focused on specific patient groups or treatments and followed the complication rates 
without distinction whether a complication was related to healthcare management or to the 
patient’s underlying condition or disease136. International AE studies using RRR reported 
few data about the incidence and nature of orthopaedic AEs because these data were often 
included with all other surgical specialities. This makes it difficult to learn in relation to 
orthopaedic patients and context. The results from these studies were often considered from 
a national or regional perspective not from a local, departmental one. We determined it 
would be valuable to locally collect patient safety information used to form a basis for 
interventions because the frequency and nature of AEs has been found to vary significantly 
between specialities9 12 26. In Sweden, incident data is available from several different 
reporting systems on different levels, as described earlier. Incidents can be registered 
in these systems but validity can be questioned regarding these data. Data on RRR and 
orthopaedic AEs was, at that time, limited. The Wimmera Clinical Risk Management 
Model was chosen due to its capability to use different safety information methods at the 
same time in a structured way.
While there is growing awareness of quality and safety problems in healthcare systems 
it remains uncertain how best to accomplish and sustain improvement over time. There 
is unfortunately no given “best way” to implement and improve quality and safety145. We 
wanted, therefore, to evaluate an on-going nursing project at the Orthopaedic Department 
by using a retrospective case study design in order to add knowledge concerning nursing 
quality and safety improvement. Another aim was to evaluate the feasibility of RRR for 
evaluating nursing outcome. 
There has been theoretical debate on what is the “best” record review method. The methods 
using screening criteria, for example, HMPS, are mostly used in research and neither in 
local, routine data collection by, for example, clinical personnel, nor for evaluating initiated 
patient safety interventions1. GTT is a method designed to identify AEs in order to form a 
basis for improvement and to follow-up initiated interventions25. In the year 2006, the GTT 
was translated to Swedish, tested and introduced in small scale in some County Councils 
in their patient safety work. In 2008, a national handbook was written and distributed for 
the methodology. This is now in use in many County Councils in Sweden64. This method 
is widely used in hospitals in the US but the original GTT method is not scientifically 
well evaluated and published concerning, for example, PPV of the triggers. Most reported 
studies address the specialised trigger tools. We thought that it would be of interest to 
compare GTT with the more scientifically evaluated method, as was used in the Swedish 
national AE study (HMPS method). Moreover, our study would use the same cohort and 
definitions to allow comparison. To the best of our knowledge, such comparison  has not 
been published before. 
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Aims
General aiM
The general aim of this thesis was to evaluate the capability of retrospective record review 
methods to identify patient safety and quality information in orthopaedic care. 
SPecific aiMS of tHe PaPerS
Paper I
To evaluate the capability of a modified Wimmera Clinical Risk Management Model to 
identify orthopaedic adverse events. 
Paper II
To identify patient risk factors that may lead to adverse events in orthopaedic inpatients.
Paper III
To examine the design and outcome of quality improvement theme months in orthopaedic 
nursing and the feasibility of retrospective record review as a method for evaluation of 
impact on nursing practice.
Paper IV
To compare the capability of two retrospective record review methods to identify 
orthopaedic adverse events and patient outcome and to identify the screening criteria and 
triggers that predict orthopaedic adverse events.
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context 
All studies were performed at Danderyd Hospital, an acute care university hospital in the 
Stockholm metropolitan area with a catchments area of approximately 450,000 inhabitants. 
The hospital provides acute and elective specialist care focusing primarily on major disease 
groups. In 2010, the hospital had 435 beds and 101 technical beds; during that year had 
43,190 inpatient admissions, of which 36,440 were acute. Also, that year, 12,048 and 4,920 
operations were performed within inpatient and ambulatory care, respectively. The hospital 
had 3,400 employees in 2010. 
The hospital has a four-ward, 50 (paper I and II) or 52 (paper III and IV) - bed, orthopaedic 
department, which treats both elective and acutely admitted inpatients. The Department 
admits approximately 3,500 inpatients each year, which are predominantly acute care. 
Patients with hip fracture and elective surgery for hip and knee replacements are the major 
patient groups. 
PatientS and Procedure
Papers i and ii
This study was based on retrospective record review.
The Wimmera Clinical Risk Management Model77 143, described earlier, was translated 
into Swedish and adapted to our Swedish healthcare context by altering some of the safety 
information methods to those used in Sweden. Screening criteria relevant for orthopaedic 
care were added. The screening criteria used are presented in Table 1 in Appendix. 
Inclusion
All digitalised records of the 395 orthopaedic inpatients during August and September 2004 
were included. An AE had to have occurred during the index admission or within 28 days of 
discharge from the Orthopaedics Department to be included. Symptoms present when the 
patient was first admitted to hospital were excluded. 
Definitions
An AE was defined as an untoward or unintended patient event caused by healthcare 
management. Healthcare management covers the actions of individual healthcare personnel 
and also the systems and care processes used in delivering healthcare. It includes both acts 
of omission and acts of commission27.
A preventable AE was defined as an error in healthcare management due to failure in 
following accepted practice at the level of the individual or of the system26 44. 
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Data collection
A three-stage retrospective review of digitalised records was used. The two-stage review 
process used at Wimmera Base Hospital was complemented with a third, consensus stage.
In stage 1, all records were screened by a senior orthopaedic RN for the presence of one 
or more of 12 predefined screening criteria (Table 1, Appendix). A check of the traditional 
incident reporting systems was also carried out on the same cohort. As a further complement 
general practitioners was contacted by post and requested to complete and return a standard 
form if they identified any potential AE within 28 days after the patient’s discharge. Returned 
forms were included in the screening process. A county council-wide database in Stockholm, 
called Predo, was used for the detection of potential AEs that occurred within the first 28 
days of discharge. If a potential AE had occurred, the medical record was requested from the 
appropriate healthcare provider  and then screened. 
Two senior orthopaedic surgeons received a copy of the records with potential AEs and the 
accompanying nurse screening form for independent reviews. 
In stage 2, positively screened records were reviewed using a standardised protocol, review 
form (RF1), similar to the one used at Wimmera Base Hospital143. 
The degree of healthcare management causation9 26 and of preventability26 was assessed 
using a six-point scale. Events with a score of four or higher, requiring evidence that the 
causation and preventability is more likely than not, were included as AEs and preventable 
AEs, respectively (Table 2, Appendix). The severity of the AE was graded on a seven-point 
scale. A score of three or higher indicated a major AE (Table 3, Appendix)143 144. Additional 
assessments about the nature of the AE, including underlying causes, and which were based 
on existing information in the records, were also performed. 
In stage 3, the physicians reviewed and analysed all the records from stage 2 together to 
obtain consensus. A RF2, identical to RF1, was completed for all events.
If a patient had more than one AE, each was reviewed and given its own RF1 and RF2.
To validate the screening process and to identify false negatives, the records of every tenth 
admission (n=28) that had not met any of the 12 screening criteria, or had been deemed not 
to contain a potential AE by the RN, were fully reviewed by one of the reviewers.
A flowchart of the review process and outcome is presented in the result part below 
(Figure 1). 
Paper iii
We used a retrospective mixed-methods case study design146. 
In the first AE study I also systematically collected nursing data concerning, for example, 
risk assessment for pressure ulcer and malnutrition. The results showed that risk assessments 
were not being performed. These outcomes and poor results of annual county council-wide 
follow-ups led to the initiation of improvement theme months. The aim was to achieve 
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department-wide improvement of key quality and patient safety areas in a systematic, 
sustainable and timely manner. 
Improvement theme months
The quality improvement interventions used nursing teams, consisting of RNs and nurses 
assistants. The teams focused on one improvement theme at a time in two-month cycles, 
hence the term, improvement theme months. Improvement theme months used a modified 
bottom-up approach that included defined objectives, easy-to-use follow-up measurement, 
education, changes to daily routines, “reminder months” and feedback on data. In each 
improvement theme months, different evidence-based concepts, e.g. risk assessments tools, 
were implemented at the same time in all orthopaedic wards.
Data collection
The orthopaedic nursing improvement efforts, for the years 2003-2010, were studied. Data 
collection included participant observation of the improvement theme months´ efforts and 
outcome; document studies and reviews of hospital performance indicator measurement. 
The relationship in time between different improvement initiatives was mapped and analysed 
using public local, hospital, county council, and national wide documentation.
This study incorporated retrospective data from records containing risk assessment 
and outcome of pressure ulcers. We studied the impact of the first of these improvement 
theme months (pressure ulcer prevention) because this enabled retrospective evaluation of 
process and outcome measures prior to, during and after improvement theme months using 
structured review. For the evaluation of the improvement theme months´ impact, monthly 
point prevalence measurement (PPM) data was collected for 46 months (January 2007-
October 2010) using explicit RRR prior to, during, and after intervention. These 46 months 
included 2,281 admissions. The PPMs were scheduled on different days of the week so that 
all days of the week were included. Patients hospitalised for more than one month were 
only counted once in the result, i.e. the admission month. The 46 monthly point prevalence 
samples ranged from 28 to 66 admissions and the outcome were displayed in time series 
diagrams. These data were compared to annual PPMs mandated in the area of the County 
Council, and were collected from hospital administrative data, starting with the year 2003.
Paper iV 
In the last study (paper IV), we compared the HMPS and the GTT (Table 2).
Inclusion 
Three hundred and fifty randomly selected orthopaedic admissions (one department), out 
of a total population of 3,701, were included, irrespective of length of stay. The orthopaedic 
admission in the random sample constituted the index admission.
To be included in the study, the AE had to be related to care given in the Orthopaedic 
Department and, additionally, one of the following criteria had to be met:
(i) The AE had to be caused within 30 days before index admission, leading to the index 
admission;
(ii) The AE had to occur and be detected during index admission; or
(iii) The AE had to be caused during index admission and detected within 30 days of index 
Materials and methods
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discharge from the Orthopaedic Department. AEs in this criterion were not required to result 
in a new admission.
Definitions
An AE was defined, for both methods, as an unintended patient harm that was caused by 
healthcare, rather than the patient’s underlying disease process. In contrast to other HMPS 
method studies9 13 27 46, we did not require that the AE cause disability at the time of discharge 
or prolonged hospital stay. Both AEs due to acts of omission and acts of commission were 
included.
A preventable AE was defined as an error in healthcare management due to failure in 
following accepted practice at the level of either the individual or the system 26 44.
A no-harm incident is an event that reached a patient but no discernable harm resulted 20.
Data collection
Two teams comprised each of a RN and two physicians were assigned one to each method. 
To ensure validation a thoroughly written manual and well-prepared education sessions 
were used as for training and familiarising team members with the method processes. 
A two-stage RRR was performed, plus a crossover review. 
In stage 1 of the review, all records were reviewed by the RNs, one for each team. They 
screened for the presence of one or more of 18 predefined screening criteria, and for 53 
triggers, respectively. For every screening criterion or trigger detected, judgement was made 
by the RN as to whether the finding reflected the presence of a potential AE or not. The 
potential AE was described. The RN in the HMPS team also included potential no-harm 
incidents when using the screening criteria. 
In stage 2 of the review, the physicians performed an independent review of the records 
containing a potential AE. Judgement was made regarding whether patient harm had occurred 
or not. A determination was made as to whether of healthcare causation and preventability 
was indicated using the same scale as in paper I and II (Table 2, Appendix)9 26. The severity 
of the AE was assessed. Importantly, however, the two methods comprised different severity 
scales (Table 4 and 5, Appendix)9 63. In addition to these scales, all physicians documented 
which screening criteria and triggers corresponded to each AE (Table 6 and 7, Appendix). 
If a record contained more than one AE, each was reviewed separately. The HMPS method 
team also investigated the nature of the AEs, based on the available information in the 
records, and according to HMPS methodology. The physicians in the HMPS team performed 
the same review procedure for each no-harm incident. The latter results will be presented in 
a separate paper not included in this thesis.
A random sample of records was selected to be reviewed by the physicians blinded to the other 
physician in respectively team in order to examine inter-rater reliability. After independent 
review of all potential AEs, the physicians in each team met together and discussed the 
duplicated, previously reviewed records containing potential AEs. If disagreement arose, 
they worked to reach consensus. 
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Aiming to compare the physicians’ judgements across the full set of AEs, a crossover review 
was performed. All confirmed or rejected AEs were compared between the two methods 
and all discrepancies were analysed. This crossover review was the evaluation between the 
two methods to reach the “true documented and confirmed AE rate”.
To validate the nurse review process in stage 1, we used internal validation for each method 
in a two-step procedure. A senior orthopaedic surgeon and a senior anaesthesiologist were 
available to provide advice on request. The RNs and physicians entered their findings from 
the different stages directly into a database.
A flowchart of the review process and outcome is presented in the result part below in 
Figure 2. 
StatiStical MetHodS
An overview of the statistical methods used in papers I-IV is shown in Table 4.
Table 4. Overview of the statistical methods used in papers I-IV
Method Paper I Paper II Paper III Paper IV
Descriptive X X X X
Cohen’s kappa X
Spearman rank-order correlation coefficient X X
Chi-square test X X
Logistic regression X
Mann-Whitney U test X X
Fisher’s exact test X
Wilcoxon matched pairs test X
Overall, frequency, mean, percent, a 95 % confidence interval, median, range, inter-quartile 
range, time series diagram, and PPV were used for descriptive purposes. 
Cohen’s kappa was used to calculate inter-rater reliability between the two reviewers in 
paper I. The kappa values are scaled to correspond to different classifications that better 
describe agreement or consistency, as presented in Table 5147.
Table 5. The kappa values different classifications
Classification Kappa values
Poor agreement Less than 0.20
Fair agreement 0.20 to 0.40
Moderate agreement 0.41 to 0.60 
Good agreement 0.61 to 0.80
Very good agreement 0.81 to 1.00
In paper II, Spearman rank-order correlation was used for correlation analysis on variables 
that were not normally distributed. Chi-square was used to identify dichotomous variables 
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associated with AEs. The Mann-Whitney U -test was used to compare continuous variables 
not normally distributed. A multivariate analysis with AE as the dependent variable was 
performed using stepwise logistic regression. A significance level of ≥0.2 was required for 
inclusion in the regression model. 
Descriptive statistics and time series diagrams were used to examine the patterns of 
improvement theme months’ impact over time in paper III. A qualitative analysis of various 
initiatives at different levels in the healthcare organisation, and which was related to the 
improvement theme months, was also carried out. Fisher’s exact test was performed for the 
hypothesis of the differences between two proportions.
In paper IV, Chi-square was used to compare HMPS and GTT methods regarding the 
respective proportions of verified screening criteria and triggers. The Mann-Whitney U test 
was used to analyse the numbers of screening criteria and triggers in relation to AE (yes/no). 
The difference in nurse review time between the HMPS and GTT methods was analysed 
by Wilcoxon matched pairs test. The Spearman rank order correlation coefficient (rs) was 
used to assess the association between the methods regarding nurse review time and also to 
investigate “learning curves”.
Differences between groups were considered to be statistically significant if the p-values 
were <0.05 in a two-tailed test.
Calculations were made using JMP version 5.1, SAS 9.1.3, Statistica 9.0, MINITAB 16.2.1 
and Excel 2003.
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resuLts
In this section main findings from the respectively papers are presented. 
PaPer i 
In 127 of the 395 records assessed (32%), one or more screening criteria was found to be 
positive and was judged to represent a possible AE at stage 1. These 127 records contained 
136 potential AEs (Figure 1). 
At stage 2, the two orthopaedic surgeons independently judged the number of AEs to be 59 
and 52, respectively (Figure 1). 
At stage 3, 60 patients of the 395 (15%) were deemed to have been be affected by 65 (16%) 
AEs (Figure 1). Four of these AEs were detected by searching the Predo database. Of all 65 
AEs, 61 included harm, whereas, four were deemed as no-harm incidents.
Figure 1. The three-stage review process for identifying adverse events using retrospective 
record review
Records screened negative
n = 268
All inpatient records during the 
sample period
n = 395
Nurse screening
n = 395 records
Records screened positive
n = 127
Medical reviewer 1
n = 127 records
Medical reviewer 2
n = 127 records
No AE identified
n = 77 
No AE identified
n = 84 
AE identified
n = 59
AE identified
n = 52 
Medical consensus review
n = 136 events
No AE identified
n = 71 
AE identified
n = 65 AE
Stage 2
Stage 3
Stage 1
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Seven potential AEs were identified by traditional incident reporting systems, four of which 
were deemed to constitute an AE and affected three patients. One of these patients had 
the same AE, a healthcare-associated infection, reported in two incident reporting systems, 
which was also identified by RRR. The overall number of identified different AEs was 67 
(17%) (Table 6).
Table 6. Methods used for detecting adverse events
Medical 
record 
review
PSR
Lex 
Maria
PaN HSAN
Clinical incident 
reporting
GP AE 
feedback
Number 
of AEs 
identified
65 2* 0 1* 0 1 0
AE= adverse event, PSR=the Patient Injury Insurance, Lex Maria=the Swedish statute concerning reporting 
“sentinel events”, PaN=the local Patients´ Advisory Committee, HSAN=the Medical Responsibility Board, 
GP=general practitioner
* One was also identified in the medical record review.
Of the 65 AEs found from the retrospective record review, 34 were estimated to be 
preventable. Thirty-four of 65 AEs were considered to constitute major AEs, ranging from 
three-to-six on the severity scale, and with the majority scaled as three. 
The kappa values indicating reliability between the reviewers’ judgements of the presence 
of an untoward or unintended patient event, healthcare causation, preventability and severity 
at stage 2 were fair-to-good, that is, 0.44, 0.35, 0.52 and 0.62, respectively. The overall PPV 
for the screening criteria was 48 %.
In the validation of the nurse screening process no unidentified AEs could be found.
PaPer ii
In paper II only AEs identified by RRR were included.
Patients with ASA classification three and above were found in paper II to be more 
predisposed to AEs (p=0.03) and high ASA scores were also strongly correlated with age 
(p < 0.0001). Stepwise logistic regression analysis showed that AEs were more likely in 
patients who underwent a surgical procedure, (p=0.02). Patients who experienced AEs had 
longer hospital stays than patients who did not experience AEs (median length of stay 6 vs. 
3 days, respectively, p< 0.0001). Patients who experienced major AEs were significantly 
older than patients who experienced minor AEs (p<0.01).
Fifty-nine of 65 AEs occurred in patients who underwent surgical procedures. However, 
only nine of these 59 AEs were related specifically to surgical or anaesthesia technique. 
Overall, 56 of 65 AEs were judged to be due to deficiencies in the orthopaedic healthcare 
processes, and thus involved all categories of personnel.
Of all AEs, healthcare-associated infections (n=20) were most common.
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PaPer iii
Substantial differences were found for risk assessment rates for pressure ulcers by using 
Modified Norton Scale (MNS)148 both in the longitudinal follow-up (p=0.0001) and in the 
annual county council-wide measurements. Reduction in pressure ulcers rate was observed 
in the annual county council-wide measurements. In the longitudinal data, wider variation 
in the pressure ulcers rate was seen; but the baseline period of ten months, when compared 
with the corresponding period the last year showed a significant difference (p=0.004). 
Measurement data over 46 months shows a difference compared to the advertised annual 
county council-wide measurements for MNS and pressure ulcers rates. 
Explicit RRR was found to be a feasible method to collect data to evaluate improvement 
theme periods displayed in time series diagrams. 
We found that it took a long time for new guidelines, quality indicators, and safety initiatives 
to be noticed and widely used in clinical practice. The results also showed that changes were 
moderate in the first years, and this suggested to us that for a sustainable improvement 
interventions on many levels were needed. The form and structure of applying improvement 
theme months may provide a possible way of organising quality and safety improvement 
initiatives in nursing.
PaPer iV
In stage 1 of the review, 111 (HMPS method) and 132 (GTT) of the 350 records contained 
at least one positive screening criterion or trigger, and a potential AE. These were forwarded 
for physician review (Figure 2). 
After the stage 2 review, the HMPS method team found AEs in 100 records (28.6%, 95% CI: 
23.8-33.3), including 151 AEs that were due to healthcare, of which 131 (86.7%) were deemed 
preventable. Using the GTT, the physicians identified 99 AEs in 85 of the records (24.3%, 95% 
CI: 19.8-28.8) and 77 (77.8%) of these AEs were deemed preventable (Figure 2).
Figure 2. Two-stage review process for identifying adverse events 
Results
Stage 2
Physician
review
Records with no potential AE
HMPS method n = 239   GTT n = 218
GTT
47 records without AEs
HMPS method
11 records without AEs
HMPS method
151 AEs in 100 records
GTT
99 AEs in 85 records 
All admissionsduring year 2009
n = 3701
Records screened positive for 
potential AEs
HMPS method n = 111   GTT n = 132
Random  sample of admissions
n = 350
Stage 1
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In the two nurse-reviewer validation steps for GTT, seven respectively two previously 
unidentified AEs were included in the review process by the physicians. No previously 
unidentified AEs came to be later identified in one of either of the steps when using the 
HMPS method.
Four potential AEs not identified using the HMPS method, and 43 not identified by the GTT 
were identified in the crossover review process. After the stage 2 review and subsequent 
crossover review, a total of 155 and 137 AEs were identified in 104 (29.8%, 95% CI: 
24.9-34.5) and 98 (28.0%, 95% CI: 23.3-32.7) of the 350 records by using the HMPS and 
GTT methods, respectively. Of these AEs, 135 (87.1%) and 110 (80.3%) were deemed 
preventable by the physicians. Overall, 160 different adverse events were identified in 105 
records (30.0%, 95% CI: 25.2-34.8) using both methods.
To assess inter-rater reliability within the teams, 30 and 43 potential AEs were reviewed 
twice by physicians using the HMPS and GTT methods, respectively. The physicians’ 
initial assessments in the twice-reviewed records were, before team discussions considering 
healthcare causation, coherent within the teams in 93% and 88% of the cases for the 
HMPS and GTT methods respectively and preventability in 100% and 95% of the cases, 
respectively. 
The median nurse review time was significantly shorter when using the HMPS (3 minutes) 
compared to GTT (8 minutes) (p<0.001). The median review time for both physician 
reviewers using the HMPS method was six minutes. Median times for the team using GTT 
were four and eight minutes. No statistical difference was seen between the two methods´ 
physicians review times (p=0.10). 
After crossover review, a total of 466 (range 1-11 per record) screening criteria and 737 
(range 1-13 per record) triggers were identified in 195 and 233 records, respectively. The 
AE detection yield varied for each screening criterion and trigger. The percent of PPV was 
40.3% (range 0.0-80.0) for the HMPS method and 30.4% (range 0.0-100.0) for the GTT 
(p<0.001). The PPV for no-harm incidents was, overall, 27.7% (0.0-82.8). When AEs and no-
harm incidents were combined, the PPV for the HMPS method was 68.0% (range 0.0-92.0). 
The screening criteria with the highest PPV for AEs were “unplanned transfer from general 
care to intensive care”, “unplanned removal, injury or repair of organ during surgery” and 
“hospital-incurred injury”. The corresponding for the triggers were “post-operative increase 
in troponin level”, “admission to intensive care post-operatively” and “clostridium difficile 
positive stool”.
Most AEs resulted in minor, transient harm and the majority was judged to be preventable. 
The most common types of AEs were healthcare-associated infections and skin related. 
The HMPS method found 118 no-harm incidents in 91 (26.0 %, 95% CI 21.4-30.6) of the 
350 admissions, corresponding to on average 0.34 no-harm incidents per admission (range 
0-3). Ninety-four of the 118 (79.7%) no-harm incidents were classified as preventable.
The most common types of no-harm incidents were found in patients not receiving critical 
drugs, for example, antibiotics or cortisone, or who had falls without harm or anaesthesia-
related events.
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ethicAL considerAtions
Ethics approvals were obtained from the regional Ethics Committee of Stockholm for all 
studies. All studies were performed according to correct ethical practice. 
The external reviewers signed confidentially agreements to maintain the security of the 
information. 
All information about the patients was kept confidential during all stages of the study. 
Permission was obtained to examine records from the Head of the Orthopaedic 
Department and the Chief Medical Officer at Danderyd Hospital.
Permission was obtained for the obtaining data from databases according to the Personal 
Data Act149. 
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discussion incLuding 
methodoLogicAL considerAtions
The aim of this thesis was to evaluate the capability of retrospective record review methods 
for identification of AEs, and for follow-up review on local patient safety and quality 
information in orthopaedic care. In this section I will discuss my main findings including 
methodological considerations. 
Papers I and II focused on comparing a RRR with the traditional incident reporting systems 
in Swedish healthcare, with respect to capability to identify AE occurrence and AE risk 
factors in orthopaedic care. Paper III evaluated a nursing improvement initiative. Paper IV 
compared the capability of two different RRR methods to detect AEs and their predictive 
value. 
coMPariSon of SaMPleS
The studies included in this thesis are based on data from one of the largest orthopaedic 
departments in Sweden. However, the outcomes may differ from other orthopaedic 
departments and AE studies due to different case-mixes, review team composition with 
respect of medical specialities and reviewer performance ability based on skills and review 
experiences. Therefore, findings may not be generalised to other orthopaedic departments 
or AE studies. This will be further discussed in the section on validity and reliability. To the 
best of our knowledge, no other orthopaedic AE study is available for comparison with our 
results. Results illustrate the capability of RRR to identify and track orthopaedic quality and 
patient safety information; and RRR can be used to gain insight into the rates and nature of 
orthopaedic AEs. 
Comparing the demographics of the study samples for papers I, II and IV, and the annual 
orthopaedic inpatient cohorts during 2004 and 2009, results show that the study samples are 
comparable to the whole inpatient cohort at the Orthopaedic Department (Table 7). 
Table 7. Demographics of the study samples and the annual orthopaedic inpatients 
during 2004 and 2009
Demographic variables
2004
study sample
n (%)
2004
n (%)
2009
study sample
n (%)
2009
n (%)
Total number of admissions 395 2679 350 3701
Men (%) 153 (38.7) 1035 (38.6) 149 (42.6) 1475 (39.9)
Age, median years (mean years) 72 (66.1) 72 (67) 69 (66) 70 (66.5)
Emergency admission (%) 285 (72.2) 1888 (70.5) 250 (71.4) 2810 (75.9)
Patients undergoing surgery (%) 309 (78) 2150 (80.3) 270 (77.1) 2795 (75.5)
Length of hospital stay,  
median days (mean days) 5 (5.8) 5 (5.5) 4 (5.3) 4 (5.4)
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In 2004, almost all of the AEs were found using record review rather than by using incident 
reporting systems that were in place. This may reflect the department’s effectiveness in 
addressing safety at that time. Assuming that the findings from the two RRR accurately 
represent years 2004 and 2009, results can be extrapolated and compared with reported 
annual incidents by traditional systems. This extrapolation and comparison shows that 
considerable underreporting occurs five years later; and that RRR has better coverage (Table 
8). An increase in reporting rates by personnel and by patients was seen when year 2004 was 
compared with 2009. Reporting rates may vary over time and an increase in the number of 
reported incidents may not necessarily reflect worse outcome. Instead, this may result from 
more structured efforts to highlight AE issues in departmental work since 2004, such as with 
increased awareness, openness and willingness by personnel, patients and their relatives to 
report. Between these years a 38% rise in inpatient admissions can be noticed.
Table 8. Comparison of papers I and IV of estimated annual AE rate using retrospective 
record review, outcomes from the traditionally incident reporting systems during the study 
period in paper I, and actual annual rates at the Orthopaedic Department
Safety information methods
2004
study sample
n
2004
total
n
2009
study sample
n
2009
total
n
Retrospective record review 65* 441 160 (plus 
118 no-harm 
incidents)
1692 (2940 
including both 
AEs and no-
harm incidents)
Clinical incident reporting*‡ 1 53 na 197
County Councils´ Mutual Insurance 
Company‡
2 40§ na 80§
The Medical Responsibility Board*‡ 0 8§ na 9§
Lex Maria*‡ 0 4§ na 2§
The Patient’s Advisory Committee*‡ 1 4§ na 21§
* May also include events without harm. ‡ The annual rates may include incidents related to 
outpatients. § Reporting year and this may not be the same year that the incident occurred. Na, not 
applicable due to no measurement of these variables in that study. 
MetHodS for identifyinG adVerSe eVentS
Papers I and II evaluated the capability of a modified Wimmera Clinical Risk Management 
Model to identify AEs at an orthopaedic department in Sweden. The model is well established 
at the rural Wimmera Base Hospital and uses multiple data collecting methods. The cost for 
the programme is estimated to be 0.1% of the total hospital budget150. Knowledge about the 
outcome and cost for this risk management model at larger hospitals with more specialist 
care is limited. 
Paper I compared the AE rates between a RRR and the traditional incident reporting methods 
used in Sweden on the same cohort of 395 patients. The AE rate in the traditional reporting 
systems was found to be very low. Only two previously unrecognised AEs were found using 
these methods compared to 65 AEs found through the RRR. This finding is in line with other 
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studies where different AEs have been identified with different methods. Record review has 
been found to have better coverage compared to other methods16 22 69 71-75 77 78 151. 
Based on the results and the literature16 22 23 54 66 71 75 77 95 100 103 107-109 151, it is likely that many 
incidents go unnoticed and/or unreported by healthcare providers, personnel, and patients. 
Lex Maria reports and patient malpractice claims tend to focus on more severe events 
as defined by law. This selective reporting, which can be seen in paper I, may lead to an 
incorrect and disparate picture of patient safety and the rate and nature of incidents. 
It is essential to increase the reporting rates to achieve more valid and reliable data when 
using existing incident reporting systems. To be able to reduce the barriers of reporting 
requires a multilevel approach, including creating an open, safety culture. Some of the 
interventions may be made more useful if matched according to the different personnel’s 
groups. 
Most comparative studies, including those in this thesis, focus on comparing RRR with 
incident reporting systems, patient safety indicators and/or administrative/IT data within 
hospitals. Other methods, like observations, interviews, and surveys, may identify a higher 
number of AEs compared to RRR98 108 152. These methods may increase the understanding of 
contributing factors, both facilitating and hindering factors, Participation in both reporting 
and improvement efforts for patient safety by personnel and patients may bring better and 
more detailed data not otherwise available. These methods should be used more often to 
increase and deepen the patient safety knowledge. 
nature of ortHoPaedic adVerSe eVentS
The retrospective reviews presented in papers I and II found that 15% of patients had 
experienced an AE. In paper IV, the HMPS and GTT methods identified AEs in 30% and 
28% of the records, respectively. 
In the literature, the AE rate in orthopaedics is often included in total surgical AE rates, and 
is reported from as little as 2.7% to a high of 39%. Surgical AEs represent up to 66% of all 
AEs27 45 54 66 67 108 136 153-156. Studies report orthopaedics AE rates between 4.1% and 33%9 26 45 
123 124 154 157 158.
Surgery as a risk factor for adverse events
While a surgical procedure increases AE risk in orthopaedic inpatients, we reported in paper 
II that most AEs did not relate to the skill of the surgeon nor the anaesthetist, but rather to the 
orthopaedic care processes outside the operating room. Griffen et al.104 reviewed malpractice 
claims against general surgeons and found that deficiencies in care occurred more often pre- 
and post-operatively than during surgery itself. Olsen’s1 findings indicate that the majority 
of surgical patients’ problems of care were related to their care on the wards. If the aim is 
to reduce the rate of AEs, then we must pay more attention to high risk patients during their 
entire care period. This calls for an emphasis on multidisciplinary and interdepartmental 
improvement that would focus on implementation of and adherence to evidence-based 
routines and procedures, and also on other aspects of care processes that can affect patient 
safety, such as, team training, standardised hand-offs, improved communication, and the 
development of a safety culture. 
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The nature and frequency of AEs appear to differ according to speciality and procedures 
utilised within different specialities9 13 136 154 155 159 160. Zegers et al.161 found that AEs varied 
between hospitals and departments but that preventability only varied between departments. 
They argue that interventions to improve patient safety should, therefore, be tailored to 
specialities and local contexts. An error in one speciality or procedure may lead to a minor AE, 
whereas a similar error in another can lead to permanent disability29. This makes it difficult 
to compare some errors between specialties and their impact on patients and severity. Pukk-
Härenstam et al.94 found that surgical specialities accounted for 88% of patient claims to 
the County Councils´ Mutual Insurance Company, but for only 46% of hospital discharges. 
Orthopaedic and hand surgery care had the highest claims rate. The large number of claims 
in these specialities may be due to high expectations for positive outcomes among patient 
groups. Whether surgical AEs occur more frequently or simply more likely to be detected 
by patients and healthcare personnel is not well known136. Greater treatment complexity 
and invasiveness of care may increase the risk for an AE. In surgical care many such 
processes, whether pre-, peri- or post-operatively, can lead to AEs29.
adverse events and length of hospital stay
In paper II we reported that patients experiencing an AE were found to have a longer 
hospital length of stay (LOS), which is consistent with others’ findings27 46 66 70 75 158 and may 
indicate that the orthopaedic AEs themselves prolonged LOS. It is possible that patient 
co-morbidity, case complexity and other reasons may have also prolonged LOS. Even 
admissions with mild AEs have been reported to affect the LOS157 162. Kable et al.155 found 
that LOS was a significant predictor for the presence of an AE in surgical care. Prolonged 
LOS for patients with AEs not only reflects increased patient suffering but also carries 
economic consequences, including increased workload for healthcare personnel44. In an 
already stressed system this can lead to additional safety problems1. 
elderly and adverse events
We found in paper II that elderly patients were more predisposed to AEs during surgery 
and were affected by major AEs to a greater degree than younger patients. The latter 
finding is consistent with Zegers et al.123. Patients with ASA-classification three or above 
were also found to be more predisposed to AEs and high ASA score was also correlated to 
age. In contrast to many other studies9 26 27 44 45 75 124 125 136 155 156 163, age was not a significant 
risk factor for AE in our study. This may be due to our smaller sample size or that the study 
population was much older in contrast to other AE studies that have presented age26 44 45 75 
136 160. Elderly people are more likely to have more complicated diseases and underlying 
degenerative conditions that require more care activities. This increases the risk for an AE 
compared to younger patients. They are also more vulnerable to the effects of healthcare 
errors, for example, medication errors29.
Minor and major adverse events
In papers I and II, 31 of 65 AEs found by RRR were considered minor in contrast to those 
that were judged to be major according to the severity scale. This may have been due to 
focusing on medical AEs that might have led to unidentified minor AEs related to, for 
example, nursing care, although the severity scale used may have biased ratings. Most AEs 
we reported in paper IV were judged minor, which was possibly a consequence of including 
a more inclusive and broader range of AEs and the use of other severity scales. This is 
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consistent with other findings12 26 27 45 159. The severity scales used at Wimmera Base Hospital, 
HMPS methodology, and GTT are completely different which makes it difficult to compare 
severity outcomes from papers I, II and IV. 
Applying a broader definition of an AE will shift some of the focus so as to prevent high-
frequency, minor AE. The GTT AE definition may be better fitted to achieve this compared to 
the HMPS method’s definition. Olsen1 stated that even if an AE caused only minor physical 
hurt, it may still be to the detriment of patient psychological recovery, participation and the 
trust. Runciman et al.164 argue that if interventions to improve patient safety are triggered 
only by the relatively more uncommon but severe outcomes, the more frequent, commonly 
occurring safety problems, which consume a great deal of resources, will go unaddressed. 
Interventions to reduce these minor AEs will positively affect a large number of patients and 
may be cost-effective. 
Validity and reliability 
Comparing AE rates between RRR studies is associated with considerable difficulties. Data 
produced, regardless of methodology, may be biased by several factors, including: study 
setting, AE definitions, time frames for inclusion, case-mix, threshold for causation scale, 
documentation quality, representativeness of the sample and the fact that some studies only 
recorded one AE per patient165. Factors that may affect variations in judgements include 
reviewer skills, application of screening criteria/triggers and definitions, experiences 
and prevalent views of the reviewers, and training and education in the particular RRR 
methodology1 23. All these factors affect validity and reliability. 
Having a digitalised record system enabled us to avoid missing records. However, in 
papers I and II, anaesthesia monitoring forms used during and after surgery, and the lists 
of medication in paper form, were not included, which may have led to some AEs being 
unidentified. We have had control of data quality and could refer to original records if 
something had been unclear and in order to validate the administrative data. We used 
review forms that had been used in other studies, with some modifications. 
As with any retrospective record study, sufficient qualitative documentation is necessary 
to determine that an AE had occurred and to make judgements about preventability, 
severity and nature. This affects the outcome in each study in this thesis. Clinical incident 
reports, complaints and malpractice claims falling within the inclusion period in paper I 
were followed locally for three years. Because malpractice claims are reported up to ten 
years after occurrence a few claims may have been unnoticed. 
Hindsight bias may, on the other hand, provide an overestimation of AEs in papers I, II and 
IV. Also, since elderly are more predisposed for AE and our study sampled adults of higher 
age compared to other studies would be expected to increase AE frequency26 44 45 75 136 160. 
Papers I and II review orthopaedic records from a summer month (August) during which 
time the proportion of trauma patients may have been increased while number of elective 
patients, especially arthroplasty cases, would be reduced. This may have influenced the 
pattern of observed AEs. Patients with symptoms related to other conditions acquired 
before index admissions were excluded. In our study for paper IV all admissions during 
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2009 were available for randomisation. In studies for papers I, II and IV we included only 
orthopaedic-related AEs. This may have decreased the observed overall AEs rate. 
why do wimmera base Hospital and danderyd Hospital outcome differ?
Our study at Danderyd Hospital for papers I and II reported a higher rate of AEs (17%) than 
was reported from the one of the Wimmera Base Hospital’s studies (1.35%), in which nearly 
50,000 patient records were screened over eight years77. This difference might perhaps be 
explained by the fact that Wimmera Base Hospital is located in a rural setting, in contrast to 
Danderyd Hospital which is a university hospital with probably more complex treatments 
and more risks for AEs. The Wimmera study also included several, different departments, not 
just surgical that often have higher AE rates, and used only eight explicit screening criteria, 
which did not require clinical judgement by first-stage review personnel. At Wimmera Base 
Hospital they later added the screening criterion, “any medical record recommended for 
review,” but the outcome on the AE rate was not presented. In the study for papers I and II, 
all healthcare personnel notes in the records were examined for AEs. However, it was not so 
well described which notes were similarly examined in the Wimmera review process. We 
used a three-stage record review as compared to the two-stage process at Wimmera Base 
Hospital, which may have affected the outcomes since the reviewers identified a greater 
number of AEs after the consensus stage, which Wimmera does not have, as compared to 
stage 2. We obtained follow up data (county council-wide database) on patients but only 
four of a possible 65 AE were identified in this database, the rest having been identified 
either at Danderyd Hospital inpatient admissions or in outpatient visits. None of the 42 
requested records from the general practitioner contained any AE, nor did the two from 
general practitioner feedbacks. The workload needed to identify these four additional AEs 
should be a topic for discussion. 
rate of adverse event and preventability
One might wonder why the AE rate nearly doubled, as reported in paper IV compared 
to reported figures in papers I and II. Our papers I and II reported study aim to examine 
mainly medical AEs. This may have led to unidentified minor AEs, such as infiltrated 
intravenous infusions as we reported in paper IV. During the years between the studies, 
on the basis of what we learned from the RRR in organisations and among those engaged 
as reviewers, learning was achieved as to what constitutes an AE. Since the first study was 
performed, patient safety awareness has improved. 
In papers 1, II and IV, we reported higher rates of AE in surgery than are reported in some 
surgical AE studies136 153 154. However, our AE rates are more in line with reports on other 
studies, for example, GTT studies36 45 51 52 54 65-67 155 156. The number of AEs that we found 
was high, and may be due to our broad AE definition that did not require that the patient 
should have experienced any disability or prolonged hospital stay as a result of the AE. This 
procedure was in contrast to other HMPS method studies that excluded minor AEs that did 
not fulfil the criteria for AE inclusion. These studies also often include only the most severe 
AE, while all AEs are included in ours, as do both Wimmera Clinical Risk Management 
Model and GTT. In contrast to GTT, AEs due to acts of omissions were included. 
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Our finding, presented in papers I and II, that about half of AEs are preventable, is 
consistent with prior surgical studies136 154 155. The preventability rates were, however, 
considerably higher in paper IV, and is more in line with the Swedish national AE 
study that used reviewers trained in the patient safety perspective. GTT studies seldom 
measure preventability in accordance to the origin method and, if preventability has been 
measured51 52 68, other scales than the one used in the HMPS method have been used, 
making comparison difficult. 
The high AE and preventability rates in paper IV may be due to having experienced 
reviewers. Other studies have recruited reviewers from the hospitals but their skills in 
reviewing records and safety perspective are seldom reported. Preventability may also 
change over time. The preventability rates we report in papers I, II and IV emphasise the 
need for more preventive initiatives in orthopaedic care to reduce the AEs rates. Sharek 
et al.52 found that an experienced review team identified 30.2% AE; whereas, newly trained 
internal and external teams identified only 18.8 % respectively 15.3% AEs. 
Inter-rater reliability
The kappa values indicating reliability of reviewer judgement reported in paper I were 
in line with other studies26 27 44 46. The levels of agreement between physician reviewers 
were better or equal in Paper IV to those found in other studies9 13 26 46 52 53 70 123. This may 
be an effect of using detailed manuals to support judgments, identifying expert physician 
reviewers, engaging reviewers in pre-study training sessions as well as later discussions; 
and that all reviewers were participated in study design and writing of study manuals. The 
number of reviewers may also affect the agreement rate. In papers I and II, the reviewers 
were not experts, did not have previous specific training in patient safety perspective, a 
Swedish language protocol was unavailable, and limited patient safety terms and definitions 
were available. This was also the first AE study conducted in Sweden and, consequently, no 
methodological support was available within the country. These factors may have influenced 
inter-rater reliability rating causation, preventability and severity; and that would affect the 
AE rate. 
Lower inter-rater reliability has been reported for preventability than for AE-causation in 
some studies26 46 70 166 suggesting preventability may be more difficult to judge, perhaps 
because it is more subjective23. Poor quality of documentation can contribute to poor 
agreement. Even if the studies are well-planned, definitions may not be adequately clear. A 
manual cannot describe all conceivable AEs because situational and individual factors must 
be applied in the review. Implicit review, such as is described in papers I, II and IV, may be 
more affected by subjectivity that explicit review, the latter which is addressed in paper III. 
In paper III, the first PPM months were reviewed together by the two senior orthopaedic 
RNs in order to encourage consistent identification of explicit variables. 
Comparisons among five experienced GTT teams resulted in large differences in the number 
of identified AEs, as well as the assessments of preventability and severity. Only three out 
of 42 AEs were detected by all five teams65. Classen et al.53 showed that inter-reviewer 
agreement could be improved by a single training session later followed by a two-hour 
formal training session. 
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comparison of the HMPS method and the Gtt 
Debate continues as to which RRR method is the most valid, reliable, cost efficient and 
feasible during the years. Comparison between HMPS and GTT methods is difficult due to 
differences in presentation of the rates, definitions and inclusion frames. To our knowledge, 
this has been the first study that compares the capability of HMPS and GTT methods in AE 
detection using the same cohort while using the same definitions. After the review stage 2, 
52.5% more AEs were identified with the HMPS method than with the GTT. After crossover 
review 160 different AEs were found in 105 records with both methods together, and 155 
and 137 of those were identified with HMPS method and GTT, respectively. 
One could argue that the differences reported in paper IV for AE rate after review stage 2 
may mostly be dependent review time in stage 1. The nurse review time is less using the 
HMPS method than for the GTT. The result of the GTT review time in stage 1 is similar 
to the findings in another Swedish study65. The GTT strategy to search for triggers, instead 
of reading the record comprehensively, may lower sensitivity. Searching for many triggers 
in different parts of the record may take longer than just comprehensively reading the text 
and searching for broad screening criteria in orthopaedic care comprising relatively short 
hospital stays and limited documentation. Reviewer familiarity with the specific record 
system and context may have affected the numbers of identified potential AEs in review 
stage 1. Two out of three members of the HMPS method team were familiar with the record 
system and local routines of the Department, as opposed to none of the GTT team. 
After review and confirmation of AEs after stage 2, it was apparent that the HMPS team 
omitted four AEs and the GTT team had 43 unidentified AEs. We separately analysed the 
AEs identified by the HMPS method team but not those identified by the GTT team after 
stage 2. We excluded AEs that already had been rejected as AEs by the GTT team but were 
confirmed AEs by the HMPS method team, thus the 43 AEs noted above. Five of these 
43 AEs identified by the HMPS team were subsequently rejected as AEs in the crossover 
review by the GTT team, five AEs were judged to result from lack of context knowledge; 
and four appeared to go unidentified as a result of the nurse reviewer lack of familiarity with 
the digitalised record system. Twenty-seven AEs were identified by the specific triggers, 
“procedure” and “care: other”; and 27 AEs were classified as temporary harm requiring 
intervention. There were no differences in type or rate of unidentified AEs, irrespective of 
whether assessment was performed early or late in the review process. The largest difference 
after review stage 2 was found among AEs causing minor harm. Our qualitative analyse 
indicated that knowledge of orthopaedic speciality or the digitalised record system may 
have been related to nine of 38 unidentified but later confirmed AEs by the GTT team after 
review stage 2.
The boundary between a no-harm incident and minor AE is not sharp and is subject to 
individual judgement, which may affect outcomes for any participant in a review process, 
irrespectively how thoroughly the study has been designed. The discrepancy in AEs identified 
between review stage 2 and the crossover review could be due to differences in the two 
review methods and the fact that this study included less severe AEs, which according to the 
GTT method, at least as usually interpreted before study start by our expert reviewers, were 
not considered AEs. Less severe AEs included infiltrated intravenous infusions and minor 
skin abrasions. Finding a difference in AE rate after the crossover review suggests that the 
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physicians in the GTT team were more likely to reject minor events as AEs than those in 
the HMPS method team. Classen et al.53 have found that the greatest variability between the 
reviewers in data categorising severity of AEs related to the lowest harm level in the severity 
scale, that is, category E. Furthermore, the severity scale used in the GTT25 required that an 
intervention had occurred to qualify as a minor AE (category E) which could have affected 
the AE rate and inter-rater reliability outcome. The severity scale used in the HMPS method 
is, by contrast, more inclusive of minor AEs9 13. The perception of minor AEs affects the 
review outcome but also, subsequently, the organisation’s input regarding safety learning as 
discussed earlier. 
Positive predictive value
aper IV reported that individual screening criteria (also paper I) and triggers varied in 
their yield of identified AEs: Some were always associated with AEs, while others never 
were. Some of the screening criteria and triggers are irrelevant for orthopaedic care (paper 
IV) and some were never identified in our samples. This is also our experience when using 
GTT in clinical patient safety work at different hospitals. The PPV may have been affected 
by the larger number of triggers as compared to numbers of screening criteria. None of 
the AEs found indicated a need for new screening criteria or triggers. However, the non-
specific screening criterion “any other undesirable outcome not covered above” and triggers 
“procedure” and “care: other” were common and may necessitate more descriptions with 
examples in the manual to flag for AEs and facilitate the nurse review in order to create 
a more valid and reliable review process. A limitation with the screening criteria used 
in the HMPS method is that all screening criteria except three must occur during index 
admission, leading to that all readmissions, irrespectively of cause, are categorised into the 
two readmission screening criteria. Thus, screening criteria are indefinite about the type of 
AE that affected the patients outside index admissions. This may on the other hand have 
affected the total PPV positively. The total PPV reported in paper I was 48%, as compared 
to the HMPS and GTT method results reported in paper IV that showed 40% and 30%, 
respectively. This may be due to more explicit screening criteria. Naessens et al.36 indicate 
that objective, explicit triggers may lead to higher agreement but it is not feasible to create 
explicit screening criteria or triggers for every conceivable AE29. For a skilled nurse reviewer 
the broad screening criteria used in HMPS method may be easier and quicker to use than 
searching for many triggers in surgical specialities. 
feaSibility of retroSPectiVe record reView 
Record review has been criticised for being time consuming and expensive, does not 
provide real-time information, and that it is not possible to collect additional information not 
documented in the records18 78. In the development of GTT some of these limitations were 
considered. Olsen found1 that by addressing some characteristics, including: experience, 
refinement and a structured education and training program, local reviewers can be used 
rather inexpensively to systematically produce detailed data close to the discharge of the 
patient. Prospective record review, combined with review close to discharge can enable 
personnel to gain additional information not documented in the records, to investigate active 
failures and latent conditions and control bias1 41. 
Local teams may collect the additional information mentioned above even when the review 
is conducted retrospectively, within 30 days of discharge. Real-time data is, of course, ideal 
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from a learning perspective. The results reported in paper IV show that the review time for 
the experienced RNs and physicians is acceptable in relation to outcome. There are few 
studies that have collected data about review time and our review times are shorter than 
most others. The length of hospital stays may affect the review time in stage 1, making 
comparisons difficult1 59 65 150 167. Classen et al.53 discuss that if RRR can identify more AEs 
compared to traditional incident reporting methods the time used for review may be cost-
effective. I will point out that one should not forget that the clinical incident report process 
also takes time, including interruptions in work flow and writing the reports. Those written 
reports should also be analysed and categorised in order to lead to meaningful learning. 
Using a RRR process at the departmental level will be further discussed in the section on 
record review below.
Retrospective record review has been proven to be just as effective as prospective collected 
data in identifying AEs, though more preventable AEs were identified with the latter method 
overall. However, in surgery the same rate of preventable AEs was found69. Vincent129 states 
that there is no sharp division between retrospective and prospective techniques because the 
user uses previous knowledge when applying the prospective method. 
feedback of Patient Safety and quality inforMation
Explicit record review is common when performing follow-ups and when monitoring 
progress in quality and patient safety. The performance data, as process and outcomes 
results, were identified using explicit RRR as reported in paper III. A strength in that paper 
was the use of longitudinal performance data displayed in time series diagrams over nearly 
four years, making it possible to analyse variation in performance data over time prior to, 
during and after interventions. The time series may provide a pictorial representation of 
change that may support real-time action based on what results are obtained on process 
and outcome168 169. Time series are also used in GTT to display and track the AE rate over 
time. To regularly collect and display performance data over time is an important part of QI 
initiatives to help create a learning-oriented culture conducive to systematic and continuous 
improvement. Healthcare personnel need to receive feedback on their performance in order 
to change practice, increase adherence, and improve quality and safety30 170-173. One specific 
lesson learned and then discussed in paper III was how to use more systematic, timely 
information feedback earlier in the improvement initiatives to support and catalyse change 
and to provide evidence over time of the impact of changes. 
In follow-up sessions in which performance data were reported and discussed, nursing 
personnel reported they found that PPM was relatively easy to perform in daily practice. In 
my opinion, all types of measurements that personnel perform have educational elements. 
Therefore, it is important to understand the contributing factors behind the results. 
This information may help motivate and engage the nursing personnel toward further 
improvements. 
Results of the mandatory annual PPM differed from longitudinal data on MNS outcome, 
and the pressure ulcer rate in paper III. This can give an inaccurate picture of the quality and 
safety of care both to local leaders and to decision makers. Reliance on one measurement 
per year could produce misleading. Such hasty conclusions about quality and safety in 
healthcare could misdirect quality and safety improvement efforts. 
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Decision-makers at different levels in the healthcare organisation need feedback data on 
performance to influence local, regional and national patient safety initiatives41 173. A different 
kind of tailored feedback data may be needed on different levels in the organisation. Feedback 
data may need to be more detailed to the personnel at a department as they have a different 
role in creating quality and safety compared to decision makers higher up in the organisation 
who often rely on aggregated data173. Benn et al.174 describes 15 requirements for the design 
of effective feedback systems, including: creditability and content of information, capacity 
for rapid action, and role of leadership. Ideally, the feedback, learning and actions should 
occur on multiple levels. Specific quality problems, risks and incidents can be reduced at the 
local level by tailored interventions that appreciate the local context. Hospitals can reduce 
risks and the number of incidents while improving quality and safety; and this can involve 
several units. The broader healthcare system must be responsive to quality problems, risks 
and incidents, particularly, when multiple healthcare organisations are involved, and where 
a single organisations may have diffulty solving the problem18 35.
iMProVeMent of Patient Safety and quality
Paper III described the locally developed improvement theme months, which were aimed 
to improve quality and safety within orthopaedic nursing care. The improvement theme 
months used a modified bottom-up approach that included defined objectives, easy-to-
use follow-up measurement, education, changes to daily routines, “reminder months” and 
feedback on data. The improvement initiative and subject was approved by head nurses, 
but the content and ideas were generated from the bottom up, in the context of empowered 
QI teams, who were supported by a local facilitator. The initiative was in part inspired by 
findings from nursing data collected in the first study. Using the ”Breakthrough model”, 
healthcare organisations and their respective teams can close the gap between best and 
current practice, and contribute to continuous improvement work175. In Plan-Do-Study-Act 
cycles176, teams used learning gained from prior improvement theme months to improve 
the next one. A wide range of barriers to change can affect the outcome of implemented 
interventions. They can be related to the individual personnel, the social and organisational 
context, the patient and the financial system. Assessment and understanding of barriers and 
strategies to promote change may contribute to a successful implementation of evidence 
into practice. Barriers and strengths were discussed in each improvement theme months. 
The use of a facilitator may also be an important strategy to provide support to personnel to 
implement change177. In our retrospective analyse we identified five general QI principles 
that have been used in the improvement theme months and that may have affected the result 
positively: creating urgency; leadership support; motivation, involvement and commitment; 
audit and feedback, and a plan for creating progress and sustainability. 
Main findings in paper III included that implementation of improvement theme months 
was temporally and logically associated with significant improvement over time in 
both process compliance to MNS and patient outcome regarding pressure ulcer rates. 
Changes, overall, were more variable the first two years. Findings indicate that sustained 
improvement requires multilevel efforts with multiple components, including: education, 
contextual knowledge, motivated and engaged personnel, achievable goals, measurable 
outcome, structured and timely feedback, reinforcement, supportive organisational 
culture, and leadership support. Such things take time. We also found that it took long 
time for new guidelines, quality indicators, and safety initiatives to be noticed and become  
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widely used,  not only among personnel as just mentioned but also among the healthcare 
leaders and the hospital management team. The reasons for this slowness are not clear 
and require further investigations to increase the implementation speed in the future. There 
is, unfortunately, no given “best way” to implement and improve quality and safety145. 
Synthesis across studies can help organisations to create an understanding of strategies 
to support improvement178. Our improvement themes months may be a learning example 
of how to work with quality and patient safety including empowering of the nursing 
personnel in these issues. 
Paper III has some limitations that must be considered when interpreting the results. Some 
of the data was collected as part of the hospital’s annual follow up measurements in relation 
to the County Council’s quality indicators. Only simple graphical analyses of the annual 
PPM data have been possible to carry out due to poor data quality. This was also the reason 
that it was not possible to separate data concerning the Orthopaedic Department from the 
hospital’s data, which would have allowed comparison between our department and all 
other departments.
Improvement theme months were a product of a local QI project. Research efforts came 
later, which has limited our ability to collect some data that could have been identified if the 
study has been performed prospectively. Interviews with head nurses and nursing personnel 
could have further increased our understanding of their perspectives about the QI project 
and implementation successes and barriers in relation to internal and external contextual 
factors.
However, attribution is difficult. Even if we can demonstrate a temporal connection 
between improvement theme months and desirable changes in performance, we cannot 
rule out the possibility that other circumstances caused those changes, at least in part, due 
to the internal and external contextual factors as displayed in the time series diagrams. 
Improvement theme months were also multifaceted and it difficult to distinguish the effect 
of any single intervention. After initiating improvement theme months, the performance 
of the Orthopaedic Department, as captured by the County Council’s annual PPM, was 
better than the performance of the hospital overall. This suggests that improvement theme 
months had an impact on quality and safety.
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concLusions
The overall findings and conclusions from the four papers in this thesis will briefly be 
summarised as follows:
Retrospective record review may have wide coverage in capturing orthopaedic •	
adverse events at a local level and may play a vital role in the quality and safety 
information system in order to identify, categorise and analyse quality and safety 
problems and to subsequently provide a basis for interventions. 
Due to variations in data quality and coverage, several different data collecting •	
methods need to be used concurrently in order to obtain a comprehensive picture of 
deficiencies in healthcare.
When using different methods to identify patient safety information the respective •	
methods´ advantages, limitations and applications ought to be addressed. 
Increased awareness, consideration of risk factors, interventions focused on •	
multidisciplinary and interdepartmental teamwork, and strategies that focus on 
healthcare processes may reduce the frequency of adverse events in orthopaedic 
care.
Retrospective record review may be favourably used to monitor the outcomes of •	
quality and patient safety interventions over time, preferably displayed in time series 
diagrams in order to drive change.
Improvement theme months may provide a way to organise quality and safety •	
improvement initiatives in nursing. However, we found that it took a long time for 
new guidelines, quality indicators, and safety initiatives to be noticed and widely 
used in clinical practice. Changes were moderate during the first years. To achieve 
sustainable improvement, interventions on many levels of the organisation were 
needed. 
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prActicAL AppLicAtions
no-HarM incidentS
In the comparative study between HMPS and GTT methods, the HMPS method also 
addressed no-harm incidents (to be published separately). The HMPS method found 118 
no-harm incidents in 91 (26.0 %) of the 350 admissions. Ninety-four (79.7%) of the 118 
no-harm incidents were judged to be preventable. 
We found that no-harm incidents were common, and fell mainly into three areas: important 
medication, such as prophylactic antibiotics, that were not being given; falls without harm; 
and anaesthesia-related events. All such cases point to systemic failures that put patients at 
risk of suffering an AE, and are an important signal to the personnel around the patient as 
well as local leadership that routines are failing to protect patients. If attention is given only 
to harm then important safety problems may be missed. Drug failures were also among 
findings presented in paper II, as were healthcare-associated infections in paper II and IV. 
These may illustrate the healthcare organisation’s difficulty in learning from and acting 
upon patient safety information. 
There are few studies that have used RRR, including both AEs and no-harm incidents, and 
then compared the outcomes in relation to other information methods71 151. Our no-harm 
incident rate comprised from 9.5% of the total annual inpatient population composed 60% 
of the annual clinical incident reporting rate as also included harm (Table 8). This result 
is consistent with that of others’71 151 that show RRR identifies safety information about 
no-harm incidents in a structured way by using random samples and implicit review. This 
probably makes the outcome more valid and reliable than only using incident reporting 
systems, which are not systematic data collecting methods. The requirements of the Patient 
Safety Act82 are that healthcare organisations and personnel must work more proactively 
on safety issues. If no-harm incidents are included when using RRR to detect AEs in the 
hospitals, as Swedish hospitals are obliged to do starting in 2012, the validity of no-harm 
incident data, learning, patient safety outcomes and the adherence to the Act may increase. 
record reView on dePartMental leVel 
My viewpoint regarding the capability of RRR for patient safety work on a departmental 
level is based on the experience of others, as well as my own, along with findings from our 
various research studies, and practical work as a project leader for the implantation of the 
GTT at Danderyd Hospital. 
To assess the AE rate at the department level and to develop the review process is important 
in increasing departmental safety learning. By analysing and categorising the nature of AEs 
during the review process according to e.g. scales used in the HMPS method, preferably 
with the help of an electronic database, structured enhanced learning can be achieved. GTT 
traditionally collects limited information about the nature of AEs. This safety learning can 
be used to guide local limited improvement resources into specific areas and/or processes 
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where tailored interventions and redesign are necessary to create resilience51 161. The use of 
an electronic database has several advantages: reduced risk of data loss, ensures data quality, 
guides reviewers in the review process and facilitates rapid statistical data and presentation1 
51. Irrespective of method applied, it is important in clinical patient safety work to have stable 
internal review teams that can proceed to expertise and who produce consistent reviews, if 
trends are to be detected in less review time52.
If every department has its own review team, the hospital can increase the number of 
personnel with both methodological and contextual knowledge and may help it achieve 
an increased local involvement in patient safety issues. Education and training, carefully 
designed user manuals, good methodological support and follow up may be success factors 
that increase the validity and reliability of the review process. Locally collected data using 
different methods for the identification of patient safety information should be used internally 
for improvement, though not for comparison between departments or organisations due to 
the validity and reliability factors mentioned earlier. However, it is valuable if different 
departments make the same judgement of comparable types of events to obtain valid data 
within the department and the hospital. 
To learn from a wide range of deficiencies no-harm incidents may be included as discussed 
earlier. It is also important to have an inclusive definition and severity scale, to measure 
the nature of the incidents and have predictive screening criteria/triggers. To support local 
learning the steps in Figure 3, as will be described in next section, can be used. Data collected 
and analysed locally can be perceived as more credible and can therefore represent a better 
incentive for improvements. Local record reviews may lead to that the safety information 
data that forms the basis for fact-based and evidence-based interventions accumulates faster. 
The outcomes from all departments can also be aggregated and analysed at the hospital 
level in order to identify trends and patterns that may not be seen at the departmental 
level. By performing reviews on the departmental level information from the records can 
be supplemented with other information sources and may provide a more comprehensive 
picture of rate, nature and contributing factors of incidents which compensate for any lack 
of documentation in the records1 69 71.
Safety discussions within the teams are important but my experiences is that the physicians 
in the team ought to do an independent review of the records that are forwarded from the 
reviewers in stage 1 in order to achieve a wider perspective in the judgements of the nature 
of incidents and increase the physician’s safety learning. Incidents related to nursing may 
be reviewed in both stages of a RN who probably can make a better or equal judgement 
than a physician reviewer in these issues. Record review can also favourable be used in 
the follow ups of interventions and quality indicators. While having random samples every 
month or every second week these quality follow ups can be performed at the same time as 
the retrospective safety record reviews and therefore be more cost efficient than to perform 
separately reviews for these purposes. 
quality and Safety inforMation SySteMS
Multiple methods need to be used concurrent when collecting safety and quality information. 
Despite limitations various, single methods may have, combining them can serve to add 
qualitative and quantitative information needed to give a more accurate picture and a greater 
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understanding of incidents, their nature and contributing factors. Knowledge can be gained 
from a wide range of incidents18 41 69 74 179. The data collected must however have adequate 
validity, reliability and coverage. When choosing data collection methods consideration 
must be taken to the addressed problem, different methods´ strengths and limitations, the 
context in which the quality and safety problem occur and a balance of different constraints 
e.g. cost, work load, usefulness and expected outcome1. 
I have made an overview of the continuous improvement cycle in Figure 3 that illustrates 
how the quality and safety information system is linked at different steps. Some requirements 
for the respective steps are mentioned. 
Information, per se, does not make any care safer. To achieve learning it also requires that 
the receiver is open to receive the information, to learn from it and to use the data in the 
continuous improvement work. The collected data must be reviewed, categorised and later 
analysed, often as aggregated data, to see patterns and trends and to learn from contributing 
factors. It would be of value if the quality and safety information systems in Sweden could 
develop and use the same terms and categorisations to facilitate aggregated analyses and 
learning in order to disseminate knowledge and inspire for actions to improve quality and 
safety. Healthcare organisations must be aware of that there is a risk if only rely on data 
with low quality and coverage as this may lead to decisions based on wrong interpretations 
and that the organisations cannot adequately measure if the care have been safer after 
implemented interventions. 
More improvement areas will be found than can be managed at one time and by using 
standardised scales and tools prioritisations can be made. Events that are of low prioritisation 
must be further monitored143. The results from the former steps in the cycle form the basis to 
identify and select evidence-based interventions with the most impact on safety and quality 
outcome. Objectives and goals must be set in relation to the interventions. The goals ought 
to be specific, measurable, accepted, reasonable and timed (SMART)180.
It is a challenge to improve quality and patient safety33 181. To increase quality and patient 
safety interventions outcome there is a need for bridging the gap between theory and 
practice in improvement efforts by combining professional and improvement knowledge182 
183. Personnel and healthcare leaders need knowledge about how to apply and disseminate 
evidence in order to ensure that patients receive the intended evidence-based care172 178. 
In every step of the cycle reflections and evaluation also are needed. The outcome feedback 
must be timely and useful, and it should be delivered through convenient and effective 
channels to the appropriate levels in the organisation. The feedback loop on safety and 
quality issues is a continuously process rather than only temporary to effectively close the 
safety and quality feedback loop with help of timely corrective interventions174 as described 
in Figure 3. To evaluate the outcome of the implemented inventions the cycle starts over 
again. 
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Figure 3. Quality and safety information system within the continuous quality and safety 
improvement cycle
Being aware of the data quality problem and analysing and drawing conclusions carefully 
is important. 
Data quality problems must not be an excuse for healthcare organisations to dismiss 
continuous quality and safety improvement work. Safety initiatives must be approached in 
parallel with developing better methods for measuring outcomes related to patient safety and 
quality. More research is necessary to develop and compare quality and safety information 
methods. 
To radically reduce system failures and reduce the impact of risks and failures, multilevel 
interventions targeting both processes, work practice and safety culture are needed. 
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future reseArch
Further development and modification of the record review methods based on both theoretical 
and practical experiences is important to determine the “optimal record review method”, 
including combinations of screening criteria respectively triggers, systematic evaluation 
of manuals, education, implementation, method support, follow up and cost efficiency in 
relation to outcome. This may also include the validation of the use of information technology 
to identify AEs. 
Further research in quality and safety deficiencies is also needed concerning validity, 
reliability and cost efficiency in relation to information richness outcome concerning the 
methods being considered. Research may also be performed to evaluate which combinations 
of methods are best suited to identify different types of quality and safety information, how 
this favourable should be analysed and categorised, being effectively fed back, and being 
used to prioritise, provide and inform the design and evaluation of improvement strategies 
and interventions. 
Other important questions for future research are: how to further develop and implement 
a common terminology, definitions and classification in Swedish quality and incidents 
reporting systems to enable a systematic comparison and learning from different methods 
and their generated aggregated data and, how to involve patients and their relatives in a 
higher grade in order to identify quality problems, risks and incidents and use these data in 
the continuous QI. 
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popuLärvetenskApLig sAmmAnfAttning
Hälso- och sjukvård är i huvudsak till stor nytta, men är också en verksamhet fylld med 
risker som kan leda till att patienter kommer till skada. Kunskapen om att hälso- och sjuk-
vården kan skada patienterna är inte ny inte heller intresset för dessa frågor. Det som är nytt 
är att det under det senaste decenniet pågått en allmän debatt om riskerna i vården. Detta har 
lett till en ökad insikt om behovet av att mäta och förstå sjukvårdsorsakade skador och av 
att förbättra säkerheten. 
The Harvard Medical Practice Study (HMPS) som publicerades 1991 beskrivs ofta som den 
första avgörande retrospektiva journalgranskningsstudien för att identifiera skador orsakade 
av hälso- och sjukvården. Studien fann att skador inträffade vid 3.7% av alla vårdtillfällen. 
Det var dock först 1999 när the Institute of Medicines rapport To Err is Human kom som 
dessa resultat fick ett ordentligt genomslag följt av en massiv offentlig debatt. I rapporten 
angavs att skador orsakade av hälso- och sjukvården bidrog till att mellan 44 000 och 98 
000 amerikanska patienter dog årligen, vilket motsvarade tre kraschade stora passagerar-
flygplan varannan dag! Rapporten föreslog även åtgärder för hur patientsäkerheten skulle 
kunna förbättras på olika nivåer inom hälso- och sjukvården. En del anser att den moderna 
patientsäkerhetsrörelsen började i och med denna rapport då den blev en varningsklocka 
även internationellt. Ett flertal länder började genomföra egna skadestudier. Dessa studier 
fann att skador uppstod vid upp till 16.6% av alla vårdtillfällen på sjukhus och att drygt 
hälften av dessa skador bedömdes vara undvikbara.
Hösten 2007 genomförde Socialstyrelsen en studie som baserades på samma protokoll som 
HMPS. Ett representativt urval omfattande 1967 vårdtillfällen granskades och man fann att 
skador inträffat vid 12.3% av alla granskade vårdtillfällen. Av dessa bedömdes 70% vara 
undvikbara dvs. vara vårdskador. Vid extrapolering av resulatet till alla vårdtillfällen under 
ett år motsvarar detta cirka 105 000 vårdskador vilket bl.a. resulterar i cirka 630 000 extra 
vårddygn.
Modern säkerhetsforskning definierar säkerhet i system inte som avsaknad av risker eller 
misstag utan i termer av systemens förmåga att kunna hantera sårbarheter eller risker så att 
dessa inte leder till skada för t.ex. personal, utrustning eller patienter. Andra högriskbran-
scher som t.ex. flyget och kärnkraftsindustrin har kommit längre i att utveckla system för att 
följa upp och förbättra säkerheten. Erfarenheter därifrån pekar på att organisationer behöver 
informationssystem för att samla in, analysera och återföra information om såväl risker 
som avvikelser i verksamheten för att lära av dessa för att förbättra säkerheten. I hälso- och 
sjukvården finns det inte något väl utvecklat system för mätning och uppföljning av patient-
säkerheten på ett tillförlitligt sätt. Även förmågan att lära av inträffade avvikelser och att 
sprida säkerhetsinformation har brister.
En avsevärd mängd patientsäkerhetsinformation samlas in på olika nivåer inom hälso- och 
sjukvården men informationen är spridd i olika icke integrerade system och är kategoriserad 
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på olika sätt vilket försvårar en systematisk analys. Avvikelser kan identifieras på många 
olika sätt. Vissa metoder används rutinmässigt i hälso- och sjukvården medan andra mes-
tadels har använts i forskningssammanhang. En del av dessa metoder kan användas för att 
räkna ut incidens och andra är mer användbara för att identifiera bakomliggande dolda fel 
i systemen. Mätningar är viktiga för att identifiera de vanligaste riskerna och avvikelserna 
som kan utgöra underlag till förbättringar och för att följa upp effekterna. 
Med proaktiva informationskällor, t.ex. riskanalyser,kan man identifiera risker innan en ska-
da sker. De befintliga rapporteringssystemen, där både vårdgivare och personal samt patien-
ter och anhöriga kan rapportera avvikelser är dock ofta reaktiva. Rapporteringsystem kan 
vara lokala, regionala eller nationella. Alla dessa rapporteringssystem kan ge kunskap om 
brister i patientsäkerheten. Flera av dessa informationskällor har dock långa rapporteringsti-
der vilket påverkar möjligheterna att snabbt återföra aktuella erfarenheter till verksamheten. 
En del av dessa rapporteringssystem fokuserar mer på allvarliga skador vilket kan ge en 
skev bild av avvikelsernas natur och frekvens. Dessutom saknas ofta ändamålsenliga sys-
tem för återkoppling av analyser till beslutfattare på olika nivåer i verksamheterna samt till 
personalen. Det krävs även att mottagaren är öppen för att ta emot informationen, lära av 
den och använda underlaget i det systematiska förbättringsarbetet. 
Studier har visat att det finns en betydande underrapportering vad det gäller de olika befint-
liga rapporteringssystemen. Långt ifrån alla avvikelser upptäcks och av dem som upptäcks 
rapporteras enbart ett fåtal varav de flesta inte är skador. Rädsla för rättsliga påföljder, att 
personalen inte vet vad som ska rapporteras eller hur, bristande återkoppling till rapportörer 
och verksamheten påverkar rapporteringsfrekvensen. Detta i kombination med en kultur 
inom sjukvården där uppfattningen att professionella inte gör fel kan bidra till att avvikelser 
inte rapporteras eller diskuteras öppet. Detta kan leda till att möjligheter till lärande missas 
och leder även till svårigheter i få en korrekt bild av hur ofta avvikelser inträffar och hur 
säker vården är. 
Prospektiva uppföljningar, direkta kliniska observationer, enkäter och struktuerade journal-
granskningar har mestadels använts i forskningsamamanhang och är mer anpassade för att 
ange prevalens och i vissa fall incidens gällande avvikelser samt för att utvärdera effekten 
av patientsäkerhetarbetet. De flesta av dessa är resusintensiva och kan vara svåra att an-
vända kontinuerligt i det kliniska arbetet. 
Det är viktigt att vara medveten om de olika metodernas styrkor och svagheter vid analys 
av data.
Det övergripande syftet för denna avhandling var att utvärdera retrospektiva journalgransk-
ningsmetoders förmåga att identifiera patientssäkerhets- och kvalitetsinformation i ortope-
disk vård. 
I avhandlingen ingick fyra artiklar baserade på tre studier.
Kliniskt patientsäkerhetarbete handlar om att identifiera och förebygga händelser i patient-
vården som kan resultera i skada. Studier visar att frekvenser och typer av avvikelser varie-
rar mellan olika medicinska specialiteter. Det är av värde att ha kunskap om de olika specia-
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liteternas risksituationer och avvikelser för att kunna bedriva ett effektivt patientsäkerhets-
arbete. I de tidigare gjorda internationella journalgranskningsstudierna finns få ortopediska 
data avseende skador tillgängliga eftersom de oftast redovisas ihop med övriga kirurgiska 
skador. Hur journalgranskningsdata relaterade till andra svenska avvikelserapporteringsys-
tem gällande ortopedi var okänt. 
I den första studien som presenterades i artikel I och II granskades 395 patienters digitalise-
rade journaler i tre steg med hjälp av 12 kriterier och standardiserade bedömningsformulär. 
Metoden utgick ifrån the Wimmera Clinical Risk Management Model. Det genomfördes 
också en genomlysning av de traditionella rapporteringssystemen för avvikelser gällande 
samma urval. Resultaten visar att betydligt fler avvikelser identifierades med hjälp av retro-
spektiv journalgranskning. Med denna metod fann vi att 60 (15%) patienter drabbades av 
65 avvikelser. I de traditionella rapporteringssystemen fanns endast fyra avvikelser regist-
rerade av vilka två även identiferades i journalgranskningen. Totalt idenfierades 67 olika 
avvikelser. Drygt hälften av avvikelserna bedömdes som undvikbara. Av de patienter som 
ingick i journalgranskningsdelen av studien hade de som drabbades av avvikelser dubbelt så 
lång vårdtid jämfört med de som inte drabbats av en avvikelse. Trots att 59 av avvikelserna 
drabbade opererade patienter berodde endast nio av dessa på bristande kirurgisk eller anes-
tesiologisk teknik, de resterande bedömdes bero på brister i vårdprocesserna. Patienter som 
drabbades av allvarligare avvikelser var signifikant äldre än de som drabbades av lindrigare 
avvikelser. De vanligaste avvikelserna var olika typer av vårdrelaterade infektioner och sen 
upptäckt av urinretention. 
I den andra studien som redovisas i artikel III utvärderades effekten av ortopedklinikens 
förbättringsinitiativ benämnd temamånader. Den vetenskapliga utvärderingen av utfallet 
bestod av en fallstudieansats med utvärdering av process- och utfallsmått genom retrospek-
tiv journalgranskning (46 punktprevalensmätningar) före, under och efter förbättringsini-
tiativen. Totalt ingick 2281 patienter. Resultatet visade signifikanta skillnader över tid vad 
gäller riskbedömning för trycksår och trycksårfrekvens. Efter förbättringsinitiativens start 
uppvisade ortopedkliniken bättre resultat i de årliga landstingsövergripande mätningarna än 
sjukhuset som helhet. Skillnader i resultaten mellan förannonserade årliga mätningar och 
oannonserade longitudinella retrospektiva mätningar kunde tydligt iakttas vilket leder till 
slutsatsen att förannonserade mätningar kan ge en felaktig bild av vårdens kvalitet. Jour-
nalgranskning kan vara en värdefull metod för att utvärdera förbättringsarbetens utfall över 
tid vars resultat med fördel kan återkopplas till verksamheten med hjälp av tydliga tidsse-
riediagram.
Artikel IV rapporterar resultaten från den tredje och sista studien. HMPS metoden har ofta 
beskrivits som oprecis och resursintensiv jämfört med GTT. GTT används nu av många 
olika landsting i Sverige men dess validitet vad gäller identifiering av skador i relation 
till en mer vetenskapligt utvärderad journalgranskningsmetod har enligt vår kännedom inte 
tidigare undersökts. I studien granskades 350 slumpvisa ortopedvårdtillfällen under 2009. 
Två team som vardera bestod av en sjuksköterska och två läkare granskade samma journa-
ler med varsin journalgranskningsmetod i en två-stegs granskningsprocess plus ett utvär-
deringssteg. I utvärderingssteget jämfördes alla bekräftade skador och avslagna händelser 
från respektive metod och alla skador som missats av en av metoderna inkluderades i en 
ny granskningsrunda. Resultaten visade att HMPS metoden identifierade drygt 50% fler 
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skador på kortare tid än GTT efter steg två i granskningsprocessen. Totalt identifierades 160 
olika skador vid 105 vårdtillfällen (30% av vårdtillfällena) med båda metoderna. HMPS 
metoden identifierade sammanlagt 155 skador vid 104 vårdtillfällen (30% av vårdtillfäl-
lena) efter utvärderingssteget. Av dessa bedömdes 135 (87.1%) som möjliga att undvika. 
Motsvarande siffror för GTT var 137 skador vid 99 vårdtillfällen (28% av vårdtillfällena), 
varav 110 (80.3%) bedömdes vara undvikbara. Skillnaderna mellan metoderna bedömdes 
bero på metodologi och att GTT i högre grad exkluderade mindre allvarliga skador. Över-
gripande positivt prediktivt värde för att identifiera skada var 40% för HMPS metoden och 
30% för GTT. 
Sammanfattningsvis så finns det ingen enskild datainsamlingsmetod som kan identifiera 
alla risker och avvikelser. Trots de begränsningar som en del av metoderna har så komplet-
terar de varandra genom att olika kvalitativa och kvantitativa data angående frekvens och 
natur identifieras. Flera studier, inklusive vår, har visat att retrospektiv journalgranskning 
jämfört med  traditionella datainsamlingsmetoder för patientsäkerhetsinformation är den 
metod som enskilt fångar flest skador. När olika metoder har jämförts så finns det en väl-
digt liten överlappning i utfallen. Med en ökad medvetenhet om riskfaktorer och interven-
tioner baserade på tvärprofessionella och klinikövergripande strategier som fokuserar på 
hälso- och sjukvårdens processer kan förhoppningsvis avvikelserna inom ortopedisk vård 
minska. Retrospektiv journalgranskning kan vara en viktig del i ett säkerhetsinformations-
system och  i patientsäkerhetsarbetet samt kan även användas för att identifiera tillbud. Vid 
användning av journalgranskning bör olika metoders svagheter och styrkor tas i beaktande. 
Retrospektiv journalgranskning kan även användas för att följa upp kvalitets- och patient-
säkerhetsinitiativ över tid och data kan redovisas i överskådliga tidsseriediagram för att 
stimulera utvecklingen. 
Modellen som tillämpades i samband med temamånaderna underlättade att organisera för-
bättringsinitiativ inom ortopedisk omvårdnad. Det tog dock lång tid innan nya vårdprogram, 
kvalitetsindikatorer och patientsäkerhetsinitiativ började användas regelbundet i lokal kli-
nisk praxis. Förbättringarna var moderata de första åren och det behövdes interventioner på 
flera nivåer för att uppnå stadigt ökande resultat.
Utbildning, noggrant utformade manualer och bra metodstöd och uppföljning kan vara fram-
gångsfaktorer för att öka validitet och reliabilitet i journalgranskningarna. Genom att varje 
klinik kan ha egna granskningsteam kan sjukhusen öka antalet personer med metodkompe-
tens och även uppnå lokalt engagemang i dessa frågor. Lokalt insamlade och analyserade 
data kan upplevas som mer trovärdiga och kan därmed utgöra ett bättre incitament för för-
bättringsarbete. Data från lokala journalgranskningar kan snabbare omsättas till faktabase-
rade patientsäkerhetsinitiativ. Genom lokala granskningar kan information från journalen 
kompletteras med andra informationskällor och ge en mer heltäckande bild av avvikelsernas 
natur och bakomliggande orsaker.
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Appendix.  
used scALes, screening criteriA And triggers 
Scales, screening criteria and triggers used in paper I, II and IV are listed below. 
The screening criteria used in paper I and II and at Wimmera Base Hospital77 are 
displayed in Table 1.
Table 1. 
Screening criteria Wimmera Clinical Risk Management Model’s screening criteria
Unplanned readmission as a result of 1. 
healthcare management within 28 days
1.  Unplanned readmission within 28 days of 
discharge
Transfer from general care to intensive 2. 
care
2.  Transfer from general care to intensive care
Unplanned transfer to another 3. 
department
3.  Transfer to another acute care facility
Unplanned return to operating theatre 4. 
within seven days
4.  Return to operating theatre within seven days
Death5. 5.  Death
Cardiorespiratory arrest6. 6.  Cardiac arrest 
Length of stay greater than 7 days7. 7.  Length of stay greater than 21 days
External cause of injury codes8. 8.  Booked for theatre and cancelled
Hospital-acquired infection or sepsis9. 9.  Any medical record recommended for review 
(added later)
Complications during surgery10. 
Hospital complications that developed 11. 
during admission or within 28 days of 
discharge (e.g. myocardial infarction, 
stroke, or pulmonary embolism)
Other undesirable outcome not covered 12. 
by other criteria
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Causation and preventability scale used in paper I, II and IV are shown in Table 226.
Table 2.
Causation and preventability scale
Little or no evidence1. 
Slight evidence2. 
Not likely (less than 50:50 odds)3. 
More likely than not (greater than 50:50 odds)4. 
Strong evidence5. 
Virtually certain evidence6. 
Severity scale used in paper I and II is presented in Table 3144.
Table 3.
Severity scale 
Minor severity1. 
Minor temporary2. 
Minor permanent3. 
Major temporary4. 
Major permanent5. 
Potential major or major contributing6. 
Death7. 
Severity scale used by HMPS method team in paper IV is shown in Table 49 13.
Table 4.
Severity scale HMPS
Minimal impairment, recovery within 1 month1. 
Moderate impairment, recovery within 1 to 6 months2. 
Moderate impairment, recovery within 6 to 12 months3. 
Permanent impairment, degree of disability <50%4. 
Permanent impairment, degree of disability >50%5. 
Contributed to patient death6. 
Unable to determine7. 
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Severity scale used by GTT team in paper IV, National Coordination Council for 
Medication Error Reporting and Prevention (NCC MERP) index, is displayed in  
Table 563.
Table 5.
Severity scale GTT
Contributed to or resulted in temporary harm to the patient and required interventionE. 
Contributed to or resulted in temporary harm to the patient and required initial or F. 
prolonged hospitalization
Contributed to or caused permanent patient harmG. 
Intervention required to sustain lifeH. 
Contributed to patient deathI. 
Screening criteria used by the HMPS method team in paper IV can be seen in Table 613.
Table 6.
Screening criteria HMPS method
The index admission was an unplanned admission related to previous healthcare 1. 
management within 30 days
Unplanned re-admission after discharge from index admission within 30 days 2. 
including outpatient visits 
Hospital-incurred patient injury or no-harm incident3. 
Adverse drug reaction4. 
Unplanned transfer from general care to intensive care5. 
Unplanned transfer to another acute care hospital6. 
Unplanned return to the operating room7. 
Unplanned removal, injury or repair of an organ during surgery8. 
Other patient complication9. 
Development of neurological deficit not present on admission10. 
Unexpected death11. 
Inappropriate discharge to home12. 
Cardiac or respiratory arrest13. 
Injury related to abortion or delivery14. 
Healthcare-associated infection or sepsis15. 
Dissatisfaction with care documented in the patient’s medical record16. 
Documentation or correspondence indicating litigation17. 
Any other undesirable outcome not covered above18. 
All screening criteria except 1, 2 or 4 must occur during index orthopaedic admission to be 
included as positive screening criteria.
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Triggers used by the GTT team in paper IV are listed in Table 764.
Table 7.
Triggers GTT
Care Module triggers
Transfusion of blood or use of blood products1. 
Abrupt drop in haemoglobin2. 
In-hospital stroke3. 
Codes or arrest4. 
Dialysis5. 
Positive blood culture6. 
X-ray or Doppler studies for emboli or deep vein thrombosis7. 
Falls8. 
Pressure ulcers9. 
Re-admission within 30 days10. 
Healthcare-associated infections11. 
Transfer to higher level of care12. 
Procedure 13. 
Care: other14. 
Medication Module Triggers
Clostridium difficile positive stool1. 
Partial Thromboplastin Time (PTT) greater than 100 seconds2. 
International Normalised Ratio (INR) greater than 63. 
Glucose less than 3 mmol/litre4. 
Rising BUN or serum creatinine two times (2x) over baseline5. 
Vitamin K administration6. 
Diphenhydramine administration7. 
Flumazenil administration8. 
Naloxone administration9. 
Anti-emetic administration10. 
Over-sedation/hypotension11. 
Abrupt medication stop12. 
Surgical Module triggers
Return to surgery1. 
Change in procedure2. 
Admission to intensive care post-operatively3. 
Intubation/reintubation / BiPaP in post anaesthesia care unit4. 
X-ray intra-operative or in post anaesthesia care unit5. 
Intra- or postoperative death6. 
Mechanical ventilation greater than 24 h post-operatively7. 
Intra-operative administration of epinephrine, norepinephrine, naloxone or flumazenil8. 
Post-operative increase in troponin levels9. 
Change of anaesthetic during surgery10. 
Consult requested in post anaesthesia care unit11. 
Occurrence of any postoperative complication12. 
Pathology reports normal or identifying specimen unrelated to initial surgical diagnosis13. 
Insertion of arterial or central venous line during surgery14. 
Operative time greater than 6 h15. 
Removal/injury or repair of organ during operative procedure16. 
Intensive Care Module Triggers
Pneumonia onset1. 
Readmission to intensive care unit2. 
In-unit procedure3. 
Intubation/reintubation4. 
Emergency Department (ED) Module Triggers
Re-admission to the ED within 48 hours1. 
Time in ED greater than 6 hours2. 
The five GTT perinatal triggers were not applicable in this study.
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